



INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE: TANZANIA

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ACRONYMS

ACT	Agriculture Council of Tanzania
ANSAF	Agriculture Non-State Actors Forum
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Program
BFS	Bureau of Food Security
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program
EAC	East Africa Community
DCC	District Consultative Council
DFT	District Facilitating Team
DADP	District Agricultural Development Plan
DASIP	District Agriculture Sector Investment Project
DPP	Directorate of Policy and Planning
ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
GBS	General Budget Support
GOTZ	Government of the Republic of Tanzania
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMTC	Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee
KPL	Kilombero Plantations Limited
MAFSC	Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAP	National Agriculture Policy
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NF&NP	National Food and Nutrition Policy

NNS	National Nutrition Strategy
PMO-RALG	Prime Minister’s Office –Regional Administration and Local Government
PADEP	Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project
RCC	Regional Consultative Council
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture
TAHA	Tanzania Horticultural Association
TCCIA	Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
TAFSIP	Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFT	Ward Facilitating Team

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

PURPOSE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The path and trajectory of policy changes are complex, non-linear processes that are often unique to a particular country. No two countries share precisely the same process, experience has demonstrated that effective processes can and do share similar features; namely predictable, transparent, inclusive, and evidence-based policy-making. A core concern and commitment of African leaders in advancing the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework is to establish a policy enabling environment for the implementation of national agricultural investment plans. In support of this goal and recognizing the critical importance of the quality of the policy change process, USAID Bureau of Food Security (BFS) is emphasizing the need for an understanding of the Institutional Architecture for Food Security Policy Change.¹

Institutional Architecture provides an approach for conducting country-level analysis of a country's capacity to undertake food security reform², by identifying implementation barriers, designing policy options, and coordinating actions across public and private institutions. This assessment examines the policy-making process through these characteristics, providing USAID, local policymakers, and other key stakeholders with information on possible constraints that could stymie effective policy change. This work will support USAID in providing technical assistance to improve the capacity and performance of the policy change process.

METHODOLOGY

Part I: Mapping of Institutional Architecture for Policy Change

The first step in this process maps out the key systems, processes, and relationships that influence the food security policy development process. This approach involves identifying and mapping the guiding policy framework; the key institutions that hold primary responsibility for implementation; inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms; private and civil society organizations, as well as think tanks and research organizations, that impact and influence the food security policy change process. These factors are examined in the context of the broader economic and social dynamics that impact the policy change environment.

Part II: Capacity of Food Security Policy Change

The second part of this assessment involves an analysis of a country's capacity to undertake transparent, inclusive, predictable, and evidence-based policy change. The country is examined

¹ Institutional Architecture is defined as the set of partner-country procedures and processes for data collection and analysis, consultation and dialogue, policy proposal, feedback, approval, implementation, and enforcement.

² Food Security is defined by Feed the Future as "when all people at all times have access to safe and sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. There are four main components: availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability of food."

through the following six components of the policy formation process to determine its ‘readiness for policy change’:

- Policy Element 1: Guiding Policy Framework
- Policy Element 2: Policy Development and Coordination
- Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation
- Policy Element 4: Evidence-based Analysis
- Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation
- Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability

Each of these components is analyzed through a set of indicators that determine the capacity and effectiveness of the overall policy change process. Each indicator is assessed using a three-tier rating system, which highlights the level of attention needed to improve the effectiveness of the component. A *Green* rating means the component is realized to a sufficient degree, and additional attention is not required. A *Yellow* rating means that the conditions required to achieve the component are partially achieved, but additional attention is required. A *Red* rating means that significant attention is needed to ensure the component is achieved. Indicators will be accompanied with a narrative analysis of key gaps and constraints to the policy change process.

Part III: Summary Conclusions and Recommendations

The third part draws conclusions based upon the above set of findings, and develops recommendations for future action.

OVERVIEW OF THE FOOD SECURITY CHANGE PROCESS IN TANZANIA

Agriculture is among the leading sectors of the Tanzanian economy and provides employment for more than three quarters of the country’s population. Although generally designated as ‘food secure’ in terms of its main food staple, maize, productivity is low for almost all staple crops; opportunities for both large- and smallscale irrigation drawing from its many rivers and lakes are unrealized, and, the diversity of its agro-ecological zones remains largely under exploited. Not only does the agriculture sector have significant potential to lift many Tanzanians out of poverty, but it could also ensure long-term food security for the country and become a ‘food reserve’ for the wider region.

Despite this potential, the agricultural sector has made only modest contribution to economic growth, food security and poverty reduction over the past decade, growing at just over 4.4% per year. By comparison, services and industry have been growing by more than 6%. This weak performance of the agriculture sector is set against a Government growth projection of 10% per year.

Since the mid-80’s, the Government of Tanzania (GoTZ), with assistance and support from its major development partners, has undertaken economic and structural adjustments in an attempt to transform the economy. Spurred by the economic doldrums of the 1980’s, and realizing that it faced an increasingly competitive global economy, Government in 1995 formulated a new national vision, **Tanzania Development Vision 2025**. Over the course of the succeeding three decades, it would be Government’s commitment to bring about;

- High Quality Livelihood
- Peace, Stability and Unity
- Good Governance
- A Well-Educated and Learning Society, and
- A Strong and Competitive Economy.

This Vision has since been embodied in a number of policy and strategy documents and plans, notably the **National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGPR)** or MKUKUTA, of 2005/6 – 2009/10. For agriculture in particular, however, economic transformation of the sector has been based on a fundamental shift in Government policy which, deviating from the past, has encouraged the private sector to actively participate in the production and marketing of agricultural produce and input supply. This shift was initiated by a review of the **1983 Agricultural and Livestock Policies**, leading to formulation of the **National Agricultural and Livestock Policy of 1997**.

This policy pronouncement was followed in 2001 with Government's adoption of its **Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS)**. ASDS was viewed as a key element in support of achieving the broader NSGPR. ASDS strategic objectives included; (i) creating an enabling and favorable environment for improved productivity and profitability in the agricultural sector; and (ii) increasing farm incomes to reduce rural poverty. Based on the sector development strategy, the **Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASPD)** 2006/7 – 2012/13, was designed as the implementing tool to achieve increased rural employment and national and household food security. Both the Strategy and Program explicitly acknowledged the pivotal importance of clear and sound economic policy to growth, noting the need for a favorable and stable macroeconomic environment as a precondition to profitable private investment, and, because of its bearing on productivity and profitability of specific subsectors.

In 2011, the Tanzania Government also concluded a compact agreement under the **Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)**. Tanzania's compact, officially titled the **Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP)** is a ten-year investment plan which maps out those investments needed to achieve the CAADP target of 6% annual growth in agricultural sector GDP. The strategic objectives of TAFSIP are:

1. To accelerate the rate of growth in agricultural productivity and production
2. Attain universal household and national food and nutrition security
3. Accelerate smallholders commercialization and agro-industrial development, and
4. Develop institutions with capacity to implement a sector-wide approach to agricultural development.

Due to expire in June of this year, both the ASDS and ASPD are undergoing *ex-post* review, and in light of the new **National Agricultural Policy (NAP) 2013** which was endorsed by the Office of the President in March 2013. The stated goal of NAP 2013 is: "To develop an efficient, competitive and profitable agricultural industry that contributes to the improvement of the livelihoods of Tanzanians and attainment of broad based economic growth and poverty alleviation" (March 2013). NAP 2013 has established the general development parameters for the **Agricultural Sector Development Plan II**, the drafting of which has been contracted to a


local consulting firm³. It is expected that ASDP II, as it is developed, will take cognizance of TAFSIP's investment priorities and provide guidance to government programs to ensure their support of its objectives.

Also in 2013, the Tanzania Government and members of the G8 committed themselves to the **“New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition”** framework. The Alliance framework calls upon signatories to work together to generate greater private investment in agricultural development, to scale innovation, achieve sustainable food security outcomes, reduce poverty and end hunger. Twenty-two private sector companies have thus far signed Letters of Intent (LoT) as partners in this process, spelling out their planned activities and financial investment commitments in support of achievement of Tanzania's food security objectives.

It is against this history and background that the Government of Tanzania is pursuing food security policy reform in order to build domestic and international private sector confidence to increase agricultural investment significantly, with the overall goal of reducing poverty and ending hunger.


³Drafting of the ASDP II has been awarded to the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), a Dar es Salaam-based consulting group which, in addition to its commercial income, receives budgetary support from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives.

INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF FOOD SECURITY POLICY REFORM: TANZANIA



POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

PLANNING, INVESTMENT AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION



ACT	Agriculture Council of Tanzania
ANSAF	Agriculture Non State Actors Forum
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Programme
CAAP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
EAC	East Africa Community
DCC	District Consultative Council
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WFT	Ward Facilitating Team

PART II: CAPACITY OF FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE

POLICY ELEMENT 1: THE GUIDING POLICY FRAMEWORK

Tanzania has a consistent set of policies and strategies for agricultural development and improving the quality of rural livelihoods, prioritizing the promotion of food security and poverty reduction. However, implementation of the plans for realizing their objectives has lacked coordination, particularly at the Local Government Authority and District levels leading to missed targets and under-performance.

OVERVIEW

Led by the **Tanzania Development Vision 2025**, the Government of Tanzania has re-focused its efforts on the agricultural sector as the engine of growth for eliminating poverty and food insecurity, and spurring rural economic development. In a break with policy of the 1980's, Government has expressly encouraged private sector investment in agriculture. To attract this investment, the GoTZ revised its agricultural policy beginning with the **National Agricultural and Livestock Policy of 1997** which opened new avenues for private sector investment in basic commodity production and marketing as well as supply of agricultural inputs.

Government's 2001 **Agricultural Sector Development Strategy** (ASDS) continued to lay out its new vision, describing the broad plan for transforming the agricultural economy into a vibrant and commercially viable sector. Fundamental objectives of the ASDS were to create an enabling and favorable environment for improved productivity and profitability, to increase farm incomes and thereby ultimately reduce rural poverty.

Specific activities, budget and investment appeals were spelled out in the **Agricultural Sector Development Program** (ASPD) 2006/7 – 2012/13, which also intended to serve as the implementing guidelines for government structures charged with achieving national and household food security.

In 2011, the Tanzania Government in partnership with the **Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme** (CAADP) formulated and received approval of its **Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan** (TAFSIP), a ten-year investment plan mapping out the investments needed to achieve the CAADP target of 6% annual growth in agricultural sector GDP. TAFSIP is now entering its implementation phase.

With both ASDS and ASPD expiring in June of this year, it was particularly timely that the GoTZ has announced the new **National Agricultural Policy (NAP) 2013**. The stated goal of NAP 2013 is: "To develop an efficient, competitive and profitable agricultural industry that contributes to the improvement of the livelihoods of Tanzanians and attainment of broad based economic growth and poverty alleviation" (March 2013). Together with TAFSIP, NAP 2013 establishes the

general development parameters and targets for the **Agricultural Sector Development Plan II**, which is in the process of being drafted.

The private sector's role in transforming Tanzania's agricultural economy has recently been reemphasized at roundtable discussions between key stakeholder investors, the Tanzania Government and members of the G8. The 2013 "**New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition**" calls upon signatories to work together to generate greater private investment in agricultural development, to scale innovation, achieve sustainable food security outcomes, reduce poverty and end hunger. Twenty-two private sector companies have thus far signed Letters of Intent (LoT) as partners in this process, and expressed their commitment to support achievement of Tanzania's food security objectives.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

a. Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework

Status: Yellow

Tanzania has a consistent set of policies and their associated implementation plans for improving the food security of the country, however, as a result of its devolution of authority and responsibility to the District level, regulations, such as imposition of tariffs on crop produce, sometimes irrespective of grades and origins, can lead to inconsistent outcomes and undermine overall policy.

b. Predictability and Transparency of the Policy-Making Process

Status: Yellow

Based on interviews with a wide cross-section of stakeholders, the policy-making process could be more transparent and certainly more predictable. While Government has made efforts to solicit input from and consult the private sector and other non-state actors on food security policy issues, consultations have not always been timely. Similarly, some short-term interventions, e.g. a zero-based tariff on rice imports, caught market actors unaware and were implemented without prior consultation, leaving them to react to an unforeseen market situation.

Clear and Functional Legislative System

Status: Yellow

The legislative system for food security policy appears widely understood as indicated by the consistent description of the process by various public and private sector actors. The system does, however, appear to function very slowly and react to changing situations slowly, particularly with reference to agricultural policy. As one interviewee noted: "Once Tanzanian policies are developed, they tend to live long. . ."

c. Appropriate Dispute Resolution Process/Judicial Framework

Status: Yellow

A legal framework, comprised of published and accessible laws – The Laws of Tanzania, Principle Legislation, Revised Edition of 2002 – exist, and are monitored, enforced and, when infringed or challenged, litigated by the Legal Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives. A number of laws are currently being reviewed, revised and/or drafted, e.g. crop laws, Irrigation Act, Contract Farming, to bring them up-to-date

with current conditions or newly promulgated policy. There is need, however, to increase the capacity of the Legal Unit in terms of equipment and personnel at the Local Government Authority level and below, to effectively perform its appointed duties.

d. Clearly Defined Institutional Responsibilities

Status: Yellow

Institutional responsibilities are well developed and clearly articulated. However, lack of analytical capacity and the supporting tools to perform rigorous policy analysis across most GOTZ institutions significantly limits ability to guide, predict or preempt undesirable outcomes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop and undertake policy analysis training for all government offices responsible for managing food security initiatives. Recognizing Government's already limited human resource capacity, this training may include in-service exercises targeting specific policy issues so as to produce results of relevance and use to on-going food security activities.
2. National Government should commit additional resources and focus efforts at the LGA and District levels to develop understanding and appreciation of food security priorities. This effort should be in combination with skills training, hard and soft tools, and collaboration on monitoring and reporting key ASDPII indicators.
3. Conduct a review, together with the Legal Unit, of regulations promulgated by the LGA and District authorities to rationalize them with food security objectives.
4. Government should more actively utilize the ACT as a forum for engaging the private sector in dialogue on food security policy and mobilizing their support on new initiatives.

POLICY ELEMENT 2: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION

Formulation of policies related to food security and agriculture have historically emanated from high in the political echelons. As the country has continued to distance itself from its state planned economy past, it is encouraging broad participation in the policy dialogue from a wider set of stakeholders. Limited resources and lack of human capacity are hampering the effectiveness of efforts in this regard, nevertheless, one discerns that the transformation process is underway. Devolution of authority to Local Government and Districts for policy implementation will, however, mean that resources and, particularly, skills development must follow this authority if implementation is to improve.

OVERVIEW

Tanzania has a decentralized federal system, consisting of 26 Regions, 132 District Local Government Authorities and 516 Divisions. Procedurally, all contribute to the food security policy dialogue and development planning but the Districts bear particular responsibility for implementation and coordination of development activities and for responsible utilization of budgeted funds. Intended to promote wider, more democratic participation, Government's "D by D – Development by Devolution" policy has conferred substantial new authorities on local

government, particularly at the district level. Districts have the power to formulate and enforce Bye-Laws. Some of these, such as 'cess' or taxes on crop production, if arbitrary or capricious, can impinge on national food security policy goals, such as increased farm income, profitability and investment.

De facto policy-making still appears to be centralized within the executive branch, with the Permanent Secretary's Office being the locus of new initiatives. The Department of Policy and Planning acts as implementer and guides policy through the formal approval process. The DPP is supported by a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit and a Statistics Unit and has the mandate to monitor policy implementation and its impacts.

The process for developing a new law or policy, in concept, may begin at any point in the sector Ministry with the advent of an issue of particular public concern. Typically, however, the formulation of a law will begin at the level of the Prime Minister, President, Cabinet or Permanent Secretary's Office. Once identified, drafting of policy is conducted by the technical staff of the Department of Policy and Planning. DPP staff propose and form a task force or technical committee to prepare the framework and policy statement. The technical team is usually composed of ministry staff together with other members who may be drawn from various implementation organs including local government authorities, research and training institutions, NGOs, occasionally from the private sector and farmers' organizations.

DPP will carry out background research on the subject and prior related policies. Stakeholder consultations will be organized and meetings with relevant government departments convened. Issues and comments arising from these meetings are incorporated into the first draft of the policy document.

This document will then be forwarded to the Cabinet Secretariat for discussion. Comments from Cabinet are then incorporated by DPP into a revised Cabinet paper. It is this 'Instrument of the Minister' that is then tabled before the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee consisting of all of the Permanent Secretaries of the Government Ministries. On matters entailing considerable technical content, the draft may be passed on to Ministry technical staff for analysis before being taken up again by the IMTC who will consider its implications. Once through the IMTC, the document is forwarded to Parliament for information and comment. Should Parliament feel it necessary or desirable, it may advise the Government should there be need to improve the policy.

From Parliament, the bill passes to the Office of the President. With the President's approval, the policy becomes official. The new policy is gazetted and published. Any new regulations or bye-laws required for enforcement of the policy will then be drafted by the Attorney General's for information, the Parliament may comment on the policy and advise the government should there be need to improve the policy.

The donor community, through individual efforts of bi-lateral programs but also through the monthly Agriculture Working Group (Ag WG), have influenced Tanzania's position and policy on promotion of national food security. Through discussion and consensus, the Ag WG has been

able to approach the GoTZ with a common position on key policy issues, such as the Food Export Ban. Indeed, the Acting Permanent Secretary recently acknowledged that it was because of the “amplification” of the export ban as counter-effective to Tanzania’s long-term food security that the ban was lifted and is not featured in the new National Agricultural Strategy.

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The agricultural sector undergoes annual joint implementation reviews and yearly Agricultural Sector Reviews and public expenditure reviews (ASR/PER) which allow stakeholders to assess performance of the sector and notably the main programme - the ASDP. The review includes the identification lessons learned and reference to their applicability for TAFSIP planning and implementation.

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CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

a. Approved Food Security Strategy/Investment Plan

Status: Green

Tanzania’s Agricultural Sector Development Plan together with its CAADP Compact Investment Plan, the Tanzania Agricultural Food Security Investment Plan constitute a clear, multi-sectoral, multi-year plan. It should be noted, however, that ASDP will lapse in the near future and ASDP II has yet to be formulated. Similarly, it remains to be seen how TAFSIP implementation will take shape.

b. Predictable Policy Agenda and Priorities Development

Status: Yellow

Priorities are well articulated under TAFSIP and ASDP I, but some facilitating policies are yet to be promulgated, such as those surrounding Land, Irrigation and Contract Farming, all crucial to attract private sector investment and the success of TAFSIP and the NAS. Recent short-term policy interventions, e.g. again, the zero percent tariff on imported rice, have created uncertainty amongst some private sector actors and it will likely take time to restore market confidence.

c. Annual Work Plans

Status: Yellow

According to procedure, annual agricultural development work plans (and budgets) flow up from the District level to the Regional Coordination Commissioners and on up the departmental structure. Past experience has been that this has led to a large number of activities with small – and inadequate - amounts of funding allocated resulting in under-achievement of results.

d. Functioning Coordination Process

Status: Red

Uniformly, within and among the government offices consulted, across the private sector and non-state actors, between policy and activities, planning and finance, national and LGA/District level implementation, coordination – or the lack thereof – was cited as a major problem. While there are regular meetings of the donor-led Agricultural Working Group, similar meetings of the wider Agricultural Sector Group are ineffective in communicating transparently what is happening within the MAFC.

e. Secretariat/Administrative Support Function

Status: Red

Administrative support within the MAFC from all accounts is significantly constrained by limited human resources, equipment, and communications, if not also a lack of appreciation for the importance of performing this role. Outside the CAADP process, no technical working groups with specific policy identification, analysis or proposal development capacity were identified that were functioning regularly.

f. Technical Capacity

Status: Red

Outside the CAADP process, no technical working groups with specific policy identification, analysis or proposal development capacity were identified that were functioning regularly. Authority for instigating activities to address weaknesses or deficiencies in the food security area appear to reside at the higher levels of the Ministry, specifically the Permanent Secretary's Office or their Deputy. A tendency to defer decision-making to superiors was observed and this perception was supported by comments made by interviewees.

g. Political Support and Approval

Status: Green

Agriculture and food security has high political attention and commitment in Tanzania, as evidenced from participation of high-level decision-makers in food security policy. Again, however, this commitment seems not to be matched by capacity at those levels where implementation should be taking place, ie. the LGA and District levels.

h. Engagement of Parliament/Legislative Body

Status: Yellow

The Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee debates all food security policy issues and refers to the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Agriculture for technical studies. However, the capacity of the Sub-Committee to undertake independent analysis is believed to be limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Initiate accelerated policy dialogue with private sector investors to negotiate and establish immediate priorities so as not to threaten successful implementation of TAFSIP. Delays associated with finalizing ASDP II could create uncertainty and undermine near-term achievements.
2. All resources necessary should be committed to finalizing those pieces of legislation and subsequent regulations essential for creating the enabling environment for TAFSIP

success, e.g. Contract Farming, Irrigation, Land Reform, etc. Although some of this legislation will be contentious, the legal framework must be established to instill confidence and assure investors of fair return on their capital. Equally important is to establish 'fair rules of play' and serve notice what behavior will and will not be tolerated under the law.

3. Similar to the role of the Donor Coordinator in the DPP Office, there should be an office responsible for coordination vertically within the MAFC and horizontally across related Ministries on food security policy. As a priority, this office should be adequately resourced in terms of personnel and equipment. Within this office, there should be a position responsible for liaising with the private sector or its representative, e.g. ACT.

POLICY ELEMENT 3: INCLUSIVITY AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

Inclusion of the private sector and civil society organizations in food security and agricultural policy reform is inconsistent and oftentimes does not provide sufficient advance notice or time for internal consultations. Stakeholders do not believe they are full partners in the food security dialogue and would like to have greater access and play a larger role in food security policy formulation. At the same time, the private sector, and only somewhat less so, the CSO community, have adopted more of a passive than proactive posture vis-à-vis the policy reform process.

OVERVIEW

The private sector plays only a marginal role in Tanzania's food security policy change process. An apex organization, the **Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT)**, has been created and is operational, but it is still in the early stages of its independence and development, and has yet to fully emerge as a 'voice' of the private sector. It has very limited in-house policy analysis capability and the analytical pieces which it has completed have relied on external consultants. ACT still has considerable work to do before it has garnered the full support and confidence of the wider private sector.

Similar issues emerge with the **Tanzania Chamber of Commerce for Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA)** – limited analytical capacity and financial resources inhibit it from meaningful, proactive engagement with those Government offices involved in food security policy reform. Notably, both ACT and TCCIA are contacted periodically by the MAFC for comment or input into new policy or legislation, but not consistently so as to create a sense of true partnership and involvement. Also, it has been reported that the time allowed by Government for comment has often been inadequate for private sector actors to confer with their members and thus, restricted a broader dialogue.

Within the CSO community, the **Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF)** have clearly established themselves as the organization with which to deal when Government wishes to address the CSO community. ANSAF has a clear structure in place, holds meetings regularly with members, and has managed to conduct some ex post policy analyses which they have published and disseminated. Notably, ANSAF has managed to do this relatively effectively at least in so far as Government attends its meetings and solicits comments from them on various issues and proposed actions. ANSAF membership does, however, consist of a fair number of international CSO's, without whose support it is uncertain how strong ANSAF's influence with the GOTZ would be.

Two established 'think tanks' exist in Tanzania which have and continue to contribute to the food security and agricultural development dialogue: **Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)** and **Policy Research for Development (REPOA)**. Unlike ACT, TCCIA and ANSAF, these organizations possess a moderate level of analytical capacity which could be brought to bear on the food security issues facing the country. Both organizations, however,

tend to 'consult' more than actively engage in dialogue with Government. One, in fact, ESRF, receives a substantial amount of budget funding from Government for its services, and, has been awarded the contract to draft ASDP II. Obviously, this relationship could be construed as potentially compromising the independence of the analyses forthcoming from the institution.

There are smaller, subsector specific associations which occasionally engage in policy dialogue with the GoTZ, such as the Tanzania Seed Traders Association (TASTA) and the Tanzanian Organic Agriculture Movement (TOAM). But they possess no policy analysis capability, have limited budgets for employing consultants and other priorities which demand their attention. They rely on their membership in other apex organizations and periodic invitations to participate in Government workshops and meetings to interject their views and positions on food security issues and policy.

The wider private sector – large commercial producers, input suppliers, marketing agents and traders – prefer to quietly go about their business and avoid attracting attention. They will and have engaged with the GoTZ on specific issues, such as the zero-based rice import tariff, when they are adversely affected. Still, in such instances they have tended to act singularly, attempt to use their influence to target a specific decision-maker or Government office, and to air grievances rather than argue their case based on evidence-based research.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

a. Inclusive Participation within the Policy Coordination Management Entity

Status: Red

Apart from the CAADP process, it was not clear that a coordination management entity responsible for coordinating with other ministries was functioning on a routine basis. The Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee operates at a much higher level and on the basis of information gathered at the operational level, does not filter down. Consultations with the private sector and non-state actors indicate little or infrequent inclusion in the policy formulation or review process and a strong desire for greater participation.

b. Outreach and Communications

Status: Yellow

Stakeholders report that information on policy reform is generally only circulated after the policy has been drafted. It was also stated that on some occasions, insufficient time was allowed for full consultation with association or community members, apparently due to political expediency. Consultations do not consistently extend to a full range of concerned stakeholders, a fact which MAFC acknowledged due to resource limitations.

c. Private Sector Participation – Opportunity/Space

Status: Yellow

Where there is private sector participation, it is predominantly ad-hoc and informal and would appear to be initiated by the private sector only when a disadvantageous issue arises. The private sector has little to no policy analysis capacity of their own, do not often engage consults for policy analysis purposes, and do not demonstrate being proactive in joining the food security policy debate.

Private Sector Participation – Capacity to Participate

Status: Yellow

There are a limited number of apex associations representing the private sector. Even these were judged to have limited capacity for policy analysis and utilizing staff with only general backgrounds in agriculture rather than specialized policy analysis training. No evidence was found of any specialized analytical tools (software) being available. Some apex organizations have utilized independent analysts for specific studies, but this has also been limited due to resource (financial) constraints. This weakens the advocacy ability of the apex organization and has damaged their credibility in the face of members.

d. Participation of CSOs – Opportunity/Space

Status: Yellow

Government has invited some of the CSO and non-state actor community to participate in dialogue on food security issues. Specifically, ANSAF, CCIA and the WFP all reported being invited to participate and/or submit comments on proposed draft food security policy, which were accepted and comments tendered. It was also noted, however, that these invitations for dialogue were infrequent and on occasion had been received quite late in the process with insufficient time for full consultation with members or time for careful consideration.

e. Participation of CSOs – Capacity to Participate

Status: Yellow

Few of the CSO's consulted had their own in-house capacity to perform policy analysis, tending, if at all, to contract out this function. 'Analysis' appeared to be more anecdotal and based on observation rather than analytics supported by evidence (data).

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Support networking and public-private dialogue forums and joint leadership training events that can continue to build trust between public, private and civil society sectors.
2. Donor support is needed to develop private sector capacity for policy analysis and evidence-based advocacy. Currently, ACT is the organization best positioned to fulfill this role. A well thought out program for developing this capacity, as well as identification of priorities around which to build it, is needed. This training should be stage one of a plan to improve meaningful communication and dialogue between the private sector and Government on broad-based, inclusive agricultural development and food security.
3. While having engaged government in the food policy debate more effectively than their private sector associates, the CSO sector would also benefit from policy analysis training and managerial capacity building with the aim of greater cohesiveness.

POLICY ELEMENT 4: EVIDENCE-BASED ANALYSIS

The Government of Tanzania appreciates the importance of evidence based policy-making as indicated by on-going efforts to improve data collection and reporting. Capacity now needs to be developed in order that the data collected can be effectively used.

OVERVIEW

The **National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)** is the primary government agency responsible for economic, demographic, social and health data collection. However, it designs, undertakes and shares responsibility for this data collection with the relevant technical Ministries. In the case of agricultural data, information collection is actually shared by three institutions; the **Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC)**, the **Ministry of Trade and Industry (MIT)** and the NBS. According to the head of the M&E Unit in MAFC, this decision is based on the required frequency of the data: production data, required only quarterly, is collected by MAFC; prices, required weekly to compute Consumer Price Indices, is collected by MIT; whereas, other longer term data, crop yields, animals produced, etc. is collected by NBS.

While from a budget standpoint this apportionment of responsibility may seem reasonable, from the standpoint of merging data for comparative analysis purposes, it represents some significant hurdles.

Furthermore, the MAFC relies on its **Agricultural Extension Officers** based in the field at District level to collect the data required. Typically, these officers are poorly equipped to carry out their duties and may not be formally trained in data collection. The fact that data must then be transposed and aggregated up to regional and then national level creates considerable scope for error and mitigates against timely availability of crucial information.

The MAFC is piloting a new system, the **Agriculture Routine Data System (ARDS)** in two regions, Dodoma and Morogoro, and hopes to extend the system throughout the country. The reporting system is based on the ASDP M&E indicators. Local Government Authorities are responsible for the actual data collection which will then be entered into computers situated at the District level and connected to a central server at MAFC headquarters. LGA data collection (Ward and Village level) training was being assisted by **Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA)**.

It is not clear, however, how the ARDS system will or is integrated into those of NBS and MIT. Notably, at the time of this assessment, a team from the **US Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Statistics Service** was consulting with NBS on a new area-based data collection frame.

Discussions have also been held with the **International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)** regarding implementation of a Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (RSAKSS), although apparently no firm decisions have been made in this regard.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

a. Economic and Financial Analysis Completed as a Component of Planning:

Status: Yellow

Economic and financial analysis underlies planning at the national level, but it is unclear to what depth the analysis penetrates, e.g. to the District and LGA levels. In addition, the integrity of the data on which it is based could be questioned. Questions have also been raised by some private sector actors regarding the selection of price, quality and crop standards used in some analysis, claiming they were not representative of the wider market.

b. Performance Monitoring Measures and Targets Developed

Status: Red

Monitoring and evaluation frameworks are said to form components of all food security program documents, however, it was widely reported that limited resources severely constrain regular monitoring activities and that lack of accountability is a problem at all levels.

c. Quality Data Exists for Policy Monitoring

Status: Red

Responsibility for data collection relating to food security is apportioned across at least three Ministries; Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Industry and Trade, and the National Bureau of Statistics. Production data is collected by MAFC. Price data is collected by Industry and Trade. NBS conducts the Agricultural Census and periodic sector updates. At least one of these Ministries stated their staff had neither the software nor training to extract or manipulate the database of the others. These data are also collected at varying time intervals, all of which compounds the difficulty of any one organization conducting analyses except at a relatively high and coarse level, and insufficient to monitor impacts on food insecure households.

d. Quality Data is available for Policy Making

Status: Red

Quality and timely reporting of data appears quite problematic. MAFC relies on LGA and District level agricultural extension officers to collect routine data, however, based on interviews conducted, agents lack the training and tools to collect the quantitative data required and, hence, information provided is much more of a visual estimate than actual measurement.

e. Inclusion of Analysis in the Policy Development Process

Status: Red

Lack of quality data and timely and routine collection, together with limited independent analytical capacity has resulted in the policy development process being guided more by gross economic indicators, such as poverty indices and localized food deficits, and political considerations. Policy outcomes or their desired impacts might be generally predicted in terms of *direction*, but without real accuracy as to the *magnitude* of impact. In both instances of the Food Export Ban and the zero-based tariff on rice imports, the policy shift was a 0-1, all or nothing approach (no food exports, no import tariff) rather than a partial, percentage reduction which could have had the same intended effects but allowed both the public and private sector to respond in a timely manner and markets to adjust gradually.

f. Capacity to Monitor Policy Implementation and Results

Status: Red

By all accounts, the PPD lacks sufficient numbers of trained staff and equipment to routinely review the limited data available and to analyze policy performance and effectiveness. Funding to outsource analyses is also limited and, as pointed out by

government management, inadequately trained staff lack the ability to critically evaluate the quality of outsourced work, all of which inhibits sound judgment in policy formulation.

g. Annual Performance Measurement Report Produced and Reviewed

Status: Yellow

The MAFC does produce an annual report on sector performance based on information submitted from regional and district authorities, and this is discussed at an annual joint review to which key development partners are invited. Integrity of the underlying data is, however, of concern.

h. Independent Analysis Capacity Exists

Status: Yellow

There are a limited number of institutions and individuals who engage in independent food security policy analysis. REPOA and ESRF are two in the private sector. ANSAF, in the CSO community, has demonstrated some policy analysis capability although it also tends to rely on external consultants. Faculty at the University of Dar es Salaam and Sokoine University of Agriculture also make their services privately available from time to time. However, engagement of these resources tends to be driven by an express need or issue, and not as the result of a proactive public dialogue on how to best achieve food security.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Collection of the routine data required to track and analyze impacts of food security policy and activities needs to be rationalized and 'housed' under one organization. Methodologies need to be confirmed and staff at the field level thoroughly trained to use them in collecting data. Resources need to be committed to ensure data quality and verification, returning feedback to the field and thereby establishing accountability.
2. There was little indication that Government was taking full advantage of technology to rapidly collect and transmit data from the field to facilitate monitoring evolving food security and market situations. For example, currently available cellular technology with built-in geo-referencing capability could enhance LGA capacity to report near real time information on crop production conditions, prices and other valuable data to Ministry level colleagues for their use.

POLICY ELEMENT 5: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation was consistently cited as the greatest weakness in the ASDP food security plan, characterized by over regulation (bureaucracy), diffuse authority, lack of resources, capacity and accountability.

OVERVIEW

Policy initiatives tend to originate at the Permanent Secretary level and above, however, policy implementation is the responsibility of the **Regional and Local Government Authorities** (Prime Minister's Office) under the supervision of the **MAFC Department of Policy and Planning**. Government's recent 'D by D' – Development by Devolution policy has conferred substantially more power to the LGA and District level offices for agricultural development and food security policy implementation.

Ward Facilitating Teams (WFT) work in their communities to identify projects and to develop budgets. These plans are consolidated under **District Agricultural Development and Sector Investment Plans/Projects (DADP/DADIP)** which are evaluated by the District and, subsequently, the **Regional Consultative Councils (RCC)** prior to being submitted to the DPP. This will then become the structure for implementing those projects which are approved.

While in principle a very inclusive, highly participatory, grassroots approach for identifying community and agricultural development priorities, the lack of technical capacity, project management skills, and insufficient financial resources, has yielded disappointing results when implementing ASDP activities.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

a. Implementation Plans Developed

Status: Green

TAFSIP, Tanzania's investment plan developed under the CAADP Compact process, has clearly outlined those activities and investments required to achieve national food security. It has also done so using a multi-sectoral approach to ensure sustainability of food security in addition to poverty reduction and economic growth. For example, Health and Water sectors, to name but two, are key partners in the food security investment plan.

b. System in Place to Analyze Implementation Capacity Constraints

Status: Red

The GoTZ, Office of the President, has recently taken responsibility to address matters of accountability at all levels of government service. The so called "Big Results Now" initiative aims at defining measurable and tightly managed development goals, assigning clear roles and responsibilities for tasks leading to their achievement and imposing strict penalties for failure to meet agreed targets. A special 'Agricultural Delivery Agency' is to be created, also within the Office of the President, to oversee this process. But, the ADA has not yet been created and it has yet to be seen whether it can effect change and achieve results where others have previously failed.

c. Food Security Policy Priorities Aligned with Work Plans of Line Ministries

Status: Yellow

The ASDP indicates program areas and indicative budgets for achievement of food security and higher level economic and development goals. It is then the responsibility of the Regional, LGA and District Consultative Councils to develop specific projects in response to the ASDP. The councils have responded with plans but with so many individual projects that the limited resources made available have been too thinly spread to have significant impact. Many projects are also said to have been left uncompleted. Human capacity at the LGA, District level and below is also a limiting factor in achieving project targets.

The Inter Ministerial Technical Committee purportedly meets on a weekly basis to discuss and align policy across related sectors. In reality, this function is handed to supporting technical offices to address and follow-through is poor. Particularly at the level of the LGA's and District offices, policy alignment appears to be a secondary consideration when in conflict with revenue generating regulations, such as setting crop levies.

d. Policy Implementation Budget Committed by Host Country

Status: Red

Tanzania has not yet met its commitment under the Maputo Declaration of committing 10% of its total budget to agricultural development, having appropriated only 7.2% for the sector in 2012/2013. During the period of this assessment, the MAFC was presenting its proposed budget to Parliament and was strongly criticized for again failing to uphold its commitment. Although the Minister reported over TSh 25 billion unspent at the District level in 2012, Ministry offices consistently complained of a lack of funding to meet their work obligations. Local Government capacity to implement projects at the village level appears to be a major constraint to achieving planned targets.

e. Supplemental Implementation Funds Secured

Status: Yellow

It underscores Government's success in formulating a comprehensive and well-articulated CAADP investment plan (TAFSIP) and one that obviously inspired the confidence of donors, that the **Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)** has committed US\$ 22.9 million in supplemental funding towards rehabilitation of various irrigation schemes and a rice input voucher program. These funds will augment those resources already in place through on-going projects in the SAGCOT geographic corridors.

Notably, Tanzania continues to be a major recipient of donor assistance from USAID, DFID, the EU, Irish Aid, WFP and other external sources, much of this being channeled into its agricultural sector. Pressure is mounting, however, for greater accountability in the use and disbursement of these funds as evidenced by the withdrawal of a number of contributors from the 'Basket Fund'.

f. Administrative and technical capacity of staff to implement reforms.

Status: Red

DPP is under-staffed and staff retention is a problem. As new districts are created, Government has struggled to fill positions and those officers in place are poorly trained or equipped to fulfill their duties.

g. Monitoring and Evaluation

Status: Red

An M&E framework exists for ASDP and the MAFC's DPP has a dedicated unit for M&E, staffed by 8 persons. They, however, share two working computers and rely on data from the NBS for some of their reporting, although they do not have the software capabilities to manipulate raw data processed by NBS. The national M&E Unit relies on Agricultural Statistics Officers at the District level for data collection, however, as noted earlier, these individuals typically do not have formal training in statistics. In addition, there are issues with uniform and consistent methods of data collection between the MAFC and the other Ministries responsible for gathering agricultural data. An Annual Progress Report for ADSP is compiled but in view of the foregoing problems, the underlying quality of the data is questionable.

The private sector is not proactively engaged in performing M&E of food security activities apart from those which they directly support and, with few exceptions, evidence tends to be anecdotal.

There is no centralized repository for sharing reports or data on the outcomes of food security activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Support the implementation of the Agricultural Delivery Agency and BRF initiative through leadership and skills training together with the resources needed by those responsible to successfully perform their jobs and meet expectations. In other words, 'Plan for success'.
2. Continue with an economic cluster approach, such as SAGCOT, and integrate LGA and District planning into cluster development with greater focus and concentrated resources.
3. Conduct a training needs assessment at the LGA and District level and develop a plan (including budget) to address critical needs.
4. As already suggested, agree on a common set of food security indicators and data collection methodology, train all of those involved in this methodology, equip them and provide them with the resources (technology) required to collect the data in a timely manner and ensure accountability through rigorous data validation procedures.

POLICY ELEMENT 6: MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Mutual Accountability within Government ranks has in the past represented, and still represents, a significant challenge in Tanzania. The severity of the issue is recognized by the present Government and the Office of the President itself has taken up the challenge to implement policies to address it.



OVERVIEW

An area uniformly identified as in need of serious attention, accountability within and across Government departments has been further hampered by the devolution of authority to Local Government Authorities and District Offices. Lack of training and capacity in LGA and District Officers leaves staff ill-equipped to monitor projects as required. The call for more multi-sectoral projects and hence the increased number of Ministries involved in any one project, has complicated the task of coordination by already stressed departments.

Actions are being taken at the highest levels of Government to create structures and processes that encourage, reinforce and enforce mutual accountability. The Office of the President itself has assumed responsibility for changing the way government goes about its business announcing its **'Big Results Now' (BRN) initiative**. The initiative, which was recently launched with a series of 'labs' for government leaders in key positions of responsibility as well as donor partners, involves the identification of constraints to established development objectives, and isolates impediments to their achievement, and assigning step-by-step responsibility to individual offices – and sometimes even individuals – for their removal. The OP has also undertaken to establish a **"Delivery Agency"** for each lead Ministry whose duty is to monitor and report to the President, progress on agreed activities. Failure to meet agreed targets will have consequences.

As signatories to the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Tanzania” cooperation framework, the GoTZ (MAFC), together with its G8 partners and 20 private sector companies, has committed itself to specific principles and actions, including investment levels, to meet the target goals of TAFSIP.

Weekly or bi-monthly **Inter-Ministerial Cabinet Meetings** permit high level exchanges between ministries on areas and activities where collaboration is required, and represent opportunity to uphold accountability.

Joint Sector Reviews take place annually and include donor participation. These reviews, which include field visits and may last up to two weeks, allow government officials and their donor counterparts the opportunity to interact closely, and to critically review program collaboration, implementation and to discuss design and management issues. Annual Joint Sector reports (Aide Memoires) document the outcomes and recommendations of the review and provide input for design of future sector activities.

Sector wide reviews are scheduled quarterly and donors and stakeholders are said to be invited. These reviews, which occur more at the level of operations management and implementation, in principle, represent the optimum point for addressing accountability. Sector wide reviews may, in fact, only occur twice a year. Some senior officers have expressed the opinion that this is not sufficient to appropriately monitor progress towards food security and take corrective action if necessary.

The **Monitoring and Evaluation Unit** within the DPP, is charged with gathering the information required to assess progress towards goals and for producing the **ADSP Annual Progress Report**. DPP is currently piloting the Agricultural Routine Data System (ARDS) which, as the name implies, would improve its timely capture of data critical to its monitoring function. It is hoped that the system, currently being piloted in two regions, will be rolled out across the country next year. In the meantime, however, the DPP staff of 15 – seven in Statistics, and eight in M&E, struggle to keep pace with performing their duties in processing and analyzing the ASDP impact data submitted by the LGA and District Agricultural Extension Officers who collect it.

Regional and District Coordination Committees serve to filter issues affecting the agricultural community to ministry officials, and to assist in determining priorities, planning interventions and negotiating budget allocations. Their accountability is first to their constituents and appropriately reflecting their priorities; secondly, they are accountable to Government as managers of the development funds entrusted to them and for achieving the development targets set.

For the contributors to Tanzania’s food security portfolio outside the World Bank-led ‘Basket Fund’, a monthly meeting of **the Agriculture Working Group (AWG)** is held to discuss progress towards ASDP objectives. The AWG serves as a forum for coordinating activities but also provides an ombudsman function in addressing concerns with Government. But it has been

observed that many donors involved in supporting Tanzania's food security policy are now outside 'the Basket' which may be regarded as a move that complicates coordination amongst the donors and Government. It also has implications for enforcing accountability.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

a. A Forum Exists for Regularly Scheduled Donor-Government Meetings

Status: Green

Joint Sector Reviews are scheduled twice a year by Government and donors are invited to attend. Off cycle, an Agriculture Working Group consisting of donor organizations and IPO's meet regularly to confer on issues and these are then communicated by the rotating chair (presently USAID) to Government. In addition, ANSAF holds regular meetings with its members and the forum leadership communicates their concerns to Government. It was acknowledged, however, that these joint meetings should be more frequent.

b. Joint Policy Priorities Developed

Status: Green

Joint policy priorities are clearly articulated in the G8 New Alliance Cooperation Framework.

c. Monitoring System Exists

Status: Red

Monitoring and evaluation of ASDP implementation has been a weakness, so much so that the President's Office has intervened with its proposed 'Big Results Now' initiative and creation of, among others, an Agriculture Delivery Agency. The latter has yet to be formed but is expected to be functioning by the end of June 2013, indicating the high priority being accorded to it.

d. Donor Coordination – Alignment and Harmonization

Status: Green

Formulation of TAFSIP involved close coordination with the donor community and has broad support. On-going donor coordination and alignment with government agriculture and food security policies takes place through regular Agricultural Working Group meetings. There would only appear to be some disagreement as to how activity funding is managed as a number of donors have chosen to withdraw from the ASDP 'Basket' funding mechanism. This does not, however, appear to have affected coordination of activities.

e. Private Sector Accountability

Status: Red

The private sector would like more prior information from Government regarding their role where food security policy is concerned. They do not have a sense of meaningful involvement and oftentimes only learn of new initiatives through the press. ACT was established as an apex organization to represent the private sector vis-à-vis

Government, but it has yet to become a forceful lobbyist, suffering from limited resources.

Conversely, the private sector tends to be a passive observer and not proactive in engaging Government broadly on food security-related issues. Rather, company representatives will approach individuals or offices in the MAFC in an attempt to influence decision-making. More often than not, these exchanges consist of airing grievances rather than constructive dialogue.

f. CSO Sector Accountability

Status: Yellow

The CSO sector appears to have better relations with Government than the private sector, perhaps due to their more proactive approach. Government officers are frequently invited to participate in CSO workshops and discussions and, conversely, CSO's reported being contacted by Government to comment on food security policy issues. The frequency of this communication was not consistent but irregular, a fact which the CSO's attributed to lack of resources and organization on the part of the Government offices involved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Donors need to continue to be clear in their discussions with Government regarding their key performance indicators and targets, and to confer on how these relate to TAFSIP and other national food security programs, policies and activities.
2. In addition to making the noted changes in data collection and monitoring systems, reporting systems need to be improved to provide more timely and frequent feedback.
3. Strengthen the capacity of ACT and ANSAF to conduct their own policy analysis and assist both to refine their organizational strategy for becoming forceful advocates on issues of priority to their members and constituents.

PART III: CASE STUDY

THE MAIZE EXPORT BAN AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY UNCERTAINTIES

The goal of the Agricultural Marketing Policy of 2008 was to improve the livelihoods of Tanzania's rural communities through commercialization of agriculture and exploiting market opportunities by putting in place a marketing system that would facilitate the active participation of a wide range of marketing actors, including government, the private sector and civil society organizations.

Maize subsector: Maize is the key staple food crop for Tanzanian households. Maize is produced in almost every region of the Tanzanian mainland, although levels of production differ from one region to another. For the past decade, maize commodity has been subjected to an export ban by the GoTZ without consultation with producers or marketing actors. Key actors in the maize subsector viewed the ban as an example of policy failure because it denied them access to lucrative regional market opportunities and thereby undermined expansion of national and regional trade in food staples. They also argued that it created disincentives to local producers, distorted internal market prices, led to smuggling of commodities to neighboring countries resulting in market volatility and, overall, risked stalling agricultural growth and private investment in agriculture. Such interventions, they maintained fall short of Tanzania's commitment to market stability and transparency in trade policy to encourage private sector investment in agriculture sector.

Government, however, refuted the arguments of the maize lobby, defending the export ban as a measure to maintain food security in the country.

In 2011, PELLUM, a local NGO, commissioned a country study on Tanzania's market policies to inform policy advocacy work. The study examined the policies and their components - taxes, levies, cess, and non-tariff barriers which could have the effect of impeding agricultural development. An issue of particular focus was the maize export ban.

Among the study's outcomes was an advocacy strategy for engaging Government on agricultural market access issues related to non-tariff barriers, including maize export ban. The evidence presented in the study, together with continuous pressure by the private sector in collaboration with CSO's and, no doubt, donor influence, were sufficient to persuade Government to lift the maize export ban.

CONCLUSION

Tanzania has a clear and well defined set of strategies and supporting policies for improving and attaining food security throughout the country. It is anticipated that ASDP II will align with TAFSIP in setting out its priority areas for investment, and provide the necessary guidelines for the Local Government and District authorities responsible for designing and implementing project activities. It will be essential, however, that as the GoTZ continues to devolve authority and responsibility to LGA and District government structures, that these be assisted to successfully undertake their duties and adequately resourced. Particularly so if they also are to be held accountable for delivering 'Big Results Now'. Donors supporting TAFSIP and ADSP II, whether in or out of 'the Basket', must also be accountable for aligning their investments accordingly to assure success of GoTZ programs.

It will behoove the GoTZ to rationalize the national agricultural data collection system such that the MAFC can appropriately and in a timely manner monitor the impacts of food security activities.











To ensure that TAFSIP and ASDP II activities find fertile ground in which to flourish, the policy environment must continue to demonstrate *predictability, transparency, inclusiveness* and *accountability*. Several actions could be undertaken in the immediate or near future to ensure that these attributes characterize the policy change process:













- 1. Predictability in policy development:** Government should increase the flow of information about its agricultural development plans and the TAFSIP process. It might do this through the media, special CSO fora on the topic, as well as workshops targeting the private sector associations and leaders to explain the plan and process, and their potential roles in it;
- 2. Transparency surrounding the policy change process:** Expanded and increased communication with agriculture-associated interest groups, including input suppliers, machinery and equipment dealers, will serve to improve relations and understanding between the public and private sector partners having each their role to play in the successful implementation of food security initiatives;
- 3. Inclusiveness in shaping policy change:** Special efforts need be taken to reach key participants who may feel marginalized, such as women farmers, at local levels. Importantly, the channel of communication used must allow feedback from the target audience, and, Government must respond to this feedback if the target audience is to feel included. This may require additional resources to achieve but Government, with support from the donor community, should be prepared to make this a priority;












4. **Mutual accountability in support of policy reform:** There must be wide donor support for the President's 'Big Results Now' initiative backed by technical assistance and resources. This support, together with a revised framework for frequent monitoring progress towards TAFSIP goals, will be essential for bringing about the mutual accountability sought within the GoTZ and with development partners.










ANNEX I: CAPACITY FOR POLICY REFORM INDICATORS













- **Red:** requires significant attention to ensure the component is achieved.
- **Yellow:** Progress is mixed. The conditions required to achieve the component are partially achieved, but additional attention is required.
- **Green:** The component is realized to a sufficient degree, and additional attention to this area is not required at this time.

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
Policy Element 1: Predictability of the Guiding Policy Framework			
Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework: The policy framework impacting food security policy-making is clearly defined, and consistently applied and enforced from year to year.			
Predictability and Transparency of the Policy Making process: The policy development process is transparent in accordance with the rules contained within the country's constitution, basic law, and elsewhere in the formal legal framework.			
Clear and Functional Legislative System: There is a legislative capacity to deal with food security reform, and the legislative requirements are clearly defined and predictable.			
Appropriate Dispute Resolution Process/Judicial Framework: The judicial system is perceived as fair and effective, and there is an appropriate system for dispute resolution where conflicts arise relating to food security policy.			
Clearly defined Institutional Responsibilities: Institutional responsibilities are clearly defined, consistently applied, and predictable from year to year.			
Policy Element 2: Policy Development & Coordination			
Approved Food Security Strategy/Investment Plan: There is an approved/official multi-sectoral, multi-year food security plan developed, which specifies priorities and objectives, and addresses the roles of various contributors, including across government, the private sector, and CSOs. The vision and strategy to improve food security is clear.			
Predictable Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed: The policy items required to achieve the national food strategy have been identified and documented, i.e., specific policy objectives exist.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
Work Plans: There is an annual work plan that identifies objectives and activities in regard to policy development.			
Coordination Process: There is an entity, such as a coordination unit or task force, that has defined membership and meets regularly to discuss, develop and coordinate food security policy development (and oversee cross-sector coordination).			
Secretariat/Administrative Support Function: There is an adequate staff capability to perform required support processes, including coordination, meeting management, communication, and document management. This may be a stand-alone secretariat, or a responsibility within an existing entity.			
Technical Capacity: There are work groups, or technical committees, that have the authority and capacity to perform the following functions: identify policy and technical challenges/issues, develop sector- or project-specific policies/strategies, consult within the sector and draft funding proposals. There should be active participation by the private sector and CSOs on the technical work groups (as appropriate).			
Political Support and Approval: There is a line of authority/participation by high-level decision-makers above the ministerial level so as to enable efficient political support for the passage and development of new policies, e.g. involvement of prime minister's office (especially for policies that cut across sectors, e.g. trade and agriculture).			
Engagement of Parliament/Legislative Body: There is engagement from the country's legislative entity to debate and engage on food security issues, and to sponsor and advocate for the required legal/policy reforms.			
Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation			
Inclusive Participation within the Policy Coordination Management Entity: The main coordination entity has: a) clear goals and participation from key government ministries (beyond just Ministry of Agriculture) and; b) some representation from non-government entities, particularly from donors.			
Outreach and Communications: There is a process for interacting with stakeholders and sharing information. This could include regular public "forums", a website of key information and other mechanisms.			
Private Sector Participation – Opportunity/Space: The private sector is provided meaningful opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussions. This could be through participation in the management/steering committee, in technical work groups and/or through other forums. Communications and interactions should be two-way, and access to key information should be readily available.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
Private Sector Participation – Capacity to Participate: Some organizations representing the private sector have the capacity to participate in government-led discussions on food security policy. This is to say they are able to represent their members, they are able to articulate and communicate policy positions, and they are able to provide some level of evidence-based analysis to support their viewpoints.			
Participation of CSOs – Opportunity/Space: The CSO sector, including representation from women’s associations and farmers associations, is provided meaningful opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussions. This could be through participation in the management/steering committee, in technical work groups and/or through other forums. Communications and interactions should be two-way, and access to key information should be readily available.			
Participation of CSOs – Capacity to Participate: Some organizations representing civil society, including representation from women’s associations and farmers associations, have the capacity to participate in government-led discussions on food security policy. This is to say they are able to represent their members, they are able to articulate and communicate policy positions, and they are able to provide some level of evidence-based analysis to support their viewpoints.			
Policy Element 4: Evidence-based Analysis			
Economic and Financial Analysis Completed as a Component of Planning: National food security priority policy initiatives/investment plans are based on economic and financial analysis, including independent policy analysis. The analysis is available for public review.			
Performance Monitoring Measures and Targets Developed: The national food security policies/plans include specific objectives, performance indicators, and targets exist to monitor the accomplishment of the objectives.			
Quality Data Exists for Policy Monitoring: There is a database of quality statistics that is used to routinely report and analyze progress in achieving objectives. (Analysis to be conducted by USDA – and not as part of this assessment framework.)			
Quality Data is Available for Policy Making: Data on the performance of the agriculture sector and the food security are publically available and shared in a timely manner. This information is available for others to use and analyze.			
Inclusion of Analysis in the Policy Development Process: Evidence-based analysis is considered and used to develop policy priorities/policy proposals.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
Capacity to Monitor Policy Implementation and Results: The government has the ability to review data on policy performance and produce an analysis of the policy’s effectiveness. A policy analysis function/unit exists and has adequate and skilled staff, and is sufficiently funded. If required, specific analysis can be outsourced to specialized firms or consultants as needed (case-by-case).			
Annual Performance Measurement Report Produced and Reviewed: Evidence-based analysis is produced to review policy effectiveness (for implemented policies). A formal review session is held, and includes key development partners (including principal donors and multilateral partners, such as FAO and IFPRI). Recommendations are developed as a result of the review and incorporated into subsequent plans.			
Independent Analysis Capacity Exists: There exists an independent capacity to analyze food security data and use the analysis to make policy recommendations and engage in policy discussion and advocacy. Such an analysis could be conducted by a research institute, university or similar non-governmental/objective organization. This capacity should be engaged in the government's policy development and review process as, for example, through papers, forums or participation introduced in official policy review and discussion meetings.			
Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation			
Implementation Plans Developed: The overall food security strategy has been broken down into programs and projects that have: a) a sufficient level of detail to permit implementation; b) have been “packaged” into priority projects that can be managed by ministerial units; and 3) “packaged” priorities can be translated into funding proposals to gain support for projects/programs from development partners (to address financing gaps).			
System in Place to Analyze Implementation Capacity Constraints: An analysis of institutional, workforce, system and financial constraints is conducted. Critical implementation constraints are identified; a work plan is developed to address constraints; and implementation actions are moved forward (and periodically reviewed).			
Food Security Policy Priorities Aligned with Work Plans of Line Ministries: The priority policy and associated objectives of the national food security strategy are broken down into specific programs and projects (with a sufficient level of detail) so that policy actions can be implemented by line ministries. The plans of individual ministries, and units within ministries, align with overall national strategy and its policy objectives.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
Policy Implementation Budget Committed by Host Country: Resources are committed by the host country to implement the identified policy agenda. Over time, the country's budget is adjusted to provide adequate financing for the implementation of actions required to implement policy priorities. Budget documents, including budget proposals, are released fully and in a timely manner.			
Supplemental Implementation Funds Secured: Proposals can be submitted, and funds secured, to address financing gaps. Funds may come from multilateral funds (such as GAFSP), regional organizations, bilateral donors and the private sector.			
Monitoring and Evaluation: Capacity exists within the public sector, private sector, or civil society to review the effectiveness and impact of policy changes. Sector reviews are performed and other research evidence is collected. There is a system to share, store, and access the findings from these reviews.			
Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability			
A Forum Exists for Regularly Scheduled Donor-Government Meetings: These meetings discuss policy and programs and set priorities. Meetings may include, for example, Joint Sector Reviews, sector working groups or other similar arrangements.			
Joint Policy Priorities Developed: A document exists that articulates the shared policy objectives between the government and the donor community.			
Monitoring System Exists: Performance measures exist (for the performance commitments of the government and for the performance commitments of the donors). There is a schedule for reviewing and documenting progress – at least on an annual basis.			
Donor Coordination – Alignment and Harmonization: There is a process for donor participation in the food security policy process and for aligning government and donor objectives and priorities. Donor programs should contribute directly to host country strategies, plans, and objectives. This may include the signing of cooperation frameworks that indicate a joint commitment to specific policy reform goals.			
Private Sector Accountability: The government provides feedback to the private sector on the performance of the food security program (including the private sector's role) and provides an opportunity for dialogue on the program and its performance.			
CSO Sector Accountability: The government provides feedback to the CSO sector on the performance of the food security program (including the role of CSOs) and provides an opportunity for dialogue on the program and its performance.			

ANNEX 2: ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

ORGANIZATION	TYPE OF ORGANIZATION	INTERVIEWEE AND DESIGNATION	CONTACT INFORMATION
Agricultural Council of Tanzania - ACT	Private Sector	Janet Bitegeko Executive Director	jbitegeko@hotmail.com act@actanzania.or.tz Tel: +255 22 2124 851
Department of Policy and Planning, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	B. Hango Policy Analyst	
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom	International Government Donor	Alex Mangowi Private Sector Development Advisor – Sustainable Growth	a-mangowi@dfid.gov.uk Tel: +255 22 2110141
Economic and Social Research Foundation	Civil Society Policy Research and Advocacy	Oswald Mashindano Research Associate (Dept of Economics, University of Dar es Salaam)	esrf@esrf.or.tz Tel: (255-22) 2760260
European Union, Mission to Tanzania	International Government Donor	Alexandre Serres Private Sector Development	
Kilombero Plantations Limited	Private Sector	Graham Anderson Director	Graham.anderson@agricatz.com Tel: +255 785 307 000
Legal Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	Dr. Audax P. Rutabanzibwa Head of Unit	Audax.rutabanzibwa@kilimo.go.tz Tel: +255 22 285392
Lonagro Tanzania Limited	Private Sector	Lukas Botha General Manager	lukas@lonagro.co.tz Tel: +255 22 2772775
National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	Morrice Oyuke Director of Economics Statistics Directorate	moyuke@nbs.go.tz Tel: +255 786 876 188
Monitoring, Evaluation and Statistics, Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	Oswald M. Ruboha Acting Director	Oswald.ruboha@kilimo.go.tz Tel: +255 22 286 2074

Development Assistance and Coordination, Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	Margaret Ndaba Principal Economist Tanzania CAADP Coordinator	Margaret.ndaba@kilimo.go.tz Tel: +255 22 2862480
Permanent Secretary (Acting)	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	Sophia Kaduma Deputy Permanent Secretary	psk@kilimo.go.tz Tel: +255 22 2863503
REPOA – Policy Research for Development	Civil Society Policy Research and Advocacy	Samuel Wangwe Executive Director	swangwe@repa.or.tz Tel: +255 22 2700083
REPOA – Policy Research for Development	Civil Society Policy Research and Advocacy	Geoffrey Bwana Policy Research Associate	gbwana@repa.or.tz Tel: +255 78 4600900
REPOA – Policy Research for Development	Civil Society Policy Research and Advocacy	Donald Mmari Director of Research on Growth and Development	mmari@repa.or.tz Tel: +255 22 2700083
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture	Private Sector	Magdalene Mkocha Senior Development Officer (Agriculture)	mkocha@tccia.com Tel: +255 22 2119436
Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre	Government of United Republic of Tanzania	Faith Magambo Acting Director; Francis Modaha Food Science & Nutrition; Catherine Kimalando Nutrition Policy & Planning; Mcharo Shaghude Nutrition Policy & Planning	faithmagambo@yahoo.com francistluaway0820@live.com ketik69@yahoo.com infor@tfnc.or.tz Tel: +255 22 2118137/9
Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement	Private Sector	Michael Farrelly Programme Officer – Climate Change and Gender	mrfarrelly@gmail.com Tel: +255 755 503089
Tanzania Seed Traders Association	Private Sector	Bob Shuma Executive Director	bobshuma08@hotmail.com Tel +255 713 653320
U.S. Agency for International Development, Tanzania Mission	International Government Donor	David Nyange Senior Agricultural Economist / Feed the Future Deputy Team Leader	dnyange@usaid.gov Tel: +255 22 229 4490
U.S. Agency for International Development, Tanzania Mission	International Government Donor	Tom Hobgood	thobgood@usaid.gov Tel: +255789 335 309

U.S. Agency for International Development, Tanzania Mission	International Government Donor	Kevin McCown	kmccown@usaid.gov Tel: +255 684 789 684
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.	International Government Donor	Jeff Hill	jhill@usaid.gov
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.	International Government Donor	Courtney Buck	cbuck@usaid.gov
U.S. Agency for International Development, Tanzania Mission, Feed the Future	International Government Donor	Donald Mitchell Chief of Party, SERA Project	Don.mitchell@tzsera.com Tel: +255 785 997603
World Bank, Mission to Tanzania	International Development Donor	David Rohrbach Senior Agriculture Economist	drohrbach@worldbank.org Tel: +255 22 216 3200
World Food Programme Tanzania	International Food Assistance	Juvenal Kasanga Senior Agricultural Economist, Agriculture Working Group	Juvenal.kasanga@wfp.org
Yara Tanzania (Chapa Meli Fertilizers)	Private Sector	Lilian Maleko	Lilian.Maleko@yara.com Tel: +255 22 286 2958