ZAMBIA FOOD SECURITY POLICY ASSESSMENT

INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE

January 2014

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<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Agri-business Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Agriculture Consultative Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTESA</td>
<td>Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>AgSAG</td>
<td>Agricultural Sector Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Cooperating Partner</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAZ</td>
<td>Economics Association of Zambia</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food Agricultural Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FISP</td>
<td>Farmer Input Support Programme</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>Food Reserve Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSRP</td>
<td>Food Security Research Project</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Growth Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
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<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia</td>
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<td>GTAZ</td>
<td>Grain Traders Association of Zambia</td>
</tr>
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<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>Indaba Agriculture Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSRs</td>
<td>Joint Sector Reviews</td>
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<td>MAL</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>M &amp; E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NAIP</td>
<td>National Agriculture Investment Plan</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>PMRC</td>
<td>Policy Monitoring and Research Centre</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>Sector Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SNDP</td>
<td>Sixth National Development Plan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>ZCC</td>
<td>Zambia CAADP Compact</td>
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<td>ZIPAR</td>
<td>Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research</td>
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<td>ZNFU</td>
<td>Zambia National Farmers Union</td>
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

PURPOSE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The path and trajectory of policy change is a complex, non-linear process that is often unique to a particular country. However, experience has shown that effective processes share similar features, namely predictable, transparent, inclusive, and evidence–based policy making. A core concern and commitment of the African leaders in advancing the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) framework, is to establish a policy enabling environment for the implementation of the national agricultural investment plans. In support of this goal and recognizing the critical importance of the quality of the policy change process, the USAID Bureau of Food Security is emphasizing the need for an understanding of the Institutional Architecture for Food Security Policy Change.

Institutional Architecture provides an approach to conducting country-level analysis of a country’s capacity to undertake food security reform, by identifying implementation barriers, designing policy options, and coordinating actions across public and private institutions. This assessment examines the policy-making process; providing USAID, local policymakers, and other key stakeholders with information on possible constraints that could stymie effective policy change. This work will support USAID in providing technical assistance to improve the capacity and performance of the policy change process.

METHODOLOGY

PART I: MAPPING OF INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR POLICY CHANGE

The first part in this process maps out the key systems, processes, and relationships that influence food security policy development. This involves identifying and mapping: the guiding policy framework, the key institutions that hold primary responsibility for implementation, inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, private and civil society organizations, as well as think tanks and research organizations, that impact and influence the food security policy change process. These factors are examined in the context of the broader economic and social dynamics that impact the policy change environment.

1 Institutional Architecture is defined as “the set of partner-country processes, practices and priorities for data collection and analysis, consultation and dialogue, policy proposal, feedback, approval, implementation, and enforcement.”

2 Food Security is defined by Feed the Future as “when all people at all times have access to safe and sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. There are four main components: availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability of food.”
INSTITUTIONAL MAP

VISION 2030
SNDP

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY (NAP)
CAADP

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT PLAN (NAIP)

GUIDING POLICY FRAMEWORK

Strong Evidence Based Analysis
IAPRI
CSO
ZIPAR
PMRC
ACF
EAZ
IFPRI

Centralized Decision Making
Committee on Agriculture
House of Parliament

CSOs
Private Sector
Cabinet Ministers

SAG
Private Sector Associations GTAZ, Etc.
ACF
ABF
CSOs We Effect, MUSIKA COMACO, Etc.

President

ACF

MAL

FRA
AG Development Sector
FISP

ZNFU

VISION 2030
SNDP

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FRA
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FISP

ZNFU
The Institutional Map presents a visual representation of the key policy relationships and barriers. The Zambia Map highlights the gaps between major stakeholders in the private and NGO sectors with the Government policy formulation and implementation agencies. It also shows weak role of the Parliament in policy development and coordination. The remainder of this report addresses each element of the map in greater detail.
PART II: CAPACITY OF FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE

The second part of this assessment provides an analysis of a country’s capacity to undertake transparent, inclusive, predictable, and evidence-based policy change. The country is examined through the following six components of the policy formation process to determine its readiness for policy change:

- Policy Element 1: The Guiding Policy Framework
- Policy Element 2: Policy Development and Coordination
- Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation
- Policy Element 4: Evidence-based Analysis
- Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation
- Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability

Each of these components is analyzed through a set of indicators that determine the capacity and effectiveness of the overall policy change process. Each indicator is assessed using a three-tier rating system, which highlights the level of attention needed to improve the effectiveness of the component. A Green rating means the component is realized to a sufficient degree, and additional attention is not required. A Yellow rating means that the conditions required to achieve the component are partially achieved, but additional attention is required. A Red rating means that significant attention is needed to ensure the component is achieved. Indicators will be accompanied with a narrative analysis of key gaps and constraints to the policy change process.

PART III: SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The third part draws conclusions based upon the above set of findings, and develops recommendations for future action.

OVERVIEW OF THE FOOD SECURITY CHANGE PROCESS IN ZAMBIA

“We could be doing even better”. This quote sums up the feelings of many stakeholders who were interviewed during the Food Security Policy Assessment. It reflects the serious concerns that some aspects of the policy formulation and implementation environment need to be revised or changed. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that Zambia has made significant progress in improving the policy environment in recent years, and that in comparison with some other countries covered by the Africa LEAD assessments, Zambia is performing well.

Over the past decade (2001-2011) Zambia’s economy grew at an annual average of 6%, rising from -2% in 1995. The country’s macro-economic indicators improved significantly, including an inflation rate that remained in single digits. In contrast to these encouraging signs, rural poverty rates were stuck at 77% over the decade, negatively affecting the majority of the country’s population.
Despite the stagnant rural poverty, the growth rate for agriculture, fisheries and forestry since 2009 has been robust at more than 10%, exceeding the CAADP target of 6%. However, the growth rate has been highly volatile, with negative growth rates in 2005 and 2007. The high volatility is attributable to poor rainfall in these years, underscoring the high level of dependence on rain-fed agriculture in Zambia.

While the Government of Zambia’s annual spending on agriculture and rural development has exceeded the CAADP recommendation of 10%, over 70% of funds are allocated to subsidize inputs under the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) and the purchase of maize at above market rates under the Food Reserve Agency. The Zambia CAADP Compact was signed in January 2011, with the process now being taken forward under the umbrella of the Agriculture Chapter of the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) and Patriotic Front (PF) Manifesto of the current government. In March 2013, the Government published the final draft of the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) to provide the strategic framework for CAADP during the period 2014-2018.
POLICY ELEMENT 1: THE GUIDING POLICY FRAMEWORK

Zambia has a consistent set of policies and strategies for agriculture and rural development, prioritizing the promotion of food security and poverty reduction. However, policy implementation, especially as it affects the maize sector, is often unpredictable with little or no recourse through legislative or judicial processes.

OVERVIEW

After 1991, the Government of the Republic of Zambia, under President Frederick Chiluba, implemented economic and de-regulation policies including the privatization of State Owned Enterprises and the liberalization of agricultural markets and trade. From 2001-2008 the Mwanawasa administration deemed agriculture-led growth and poverty reduction as its main goals. A principal component of this policy was the Targeted Support System for Food Security which evolved into the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) in 2010. The most significant policy expanded the role of the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) into a de facto marketing board, buying maize from farmers at above market prices and selling to millers at below market prices.

The current Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) covering 2011-2015 is linked to the Vision 2030 goal for Zambia to become “a prosperous middle-income nation by 2030”. The SNDP names Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries among the priority growth sectors of the economy. Agricultural commercialization is a key objective to be accomplished through the promotion of a competitive and efficient public and private sector driven marketing system for both inputs and outputs.

The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) covering the years 2004-2015 was recently revised to focus on building a competitive, valued-added export-led agricultural sector that ensures food and nutrition security for the country. The revised NAP aims at achieving “An efficient, dynamic, competitive, sustainable and value-added export-led agricultural sector that ensures income, food and nutrition security for vulnerable rural households while ensuring the competitiveness of the agriculture industry”.

The Zambian CAADP Compact, signed in 2011, is intended to strengthen, support and facilitate effective implementation of the NAP and the Vision 2030. Subsequently, the current Government of Zambia (elected in October 2011) launched the preparation of the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) in July 2012 and released a draft copy in March, 2013. The NAIP is a 5-year road map for agriculture and rural development that identifies priority areas for investment and estimates the financing needs to be provided by the Government and its development partners. It is anchored to, and aligned with, the national vision of becoming a middle-income country by 2030.

The CAADP and NAIP processes focus on the need to realign policy and increase budget allocations to production, productivity and commercialization initiatives and redirecting funding away from low return subsidy programs. As the NAIP succinctly points out “The effectiveness of these investments will ultimately depend on improving the predictability of government action in
agricultural markets, particularly in terms of FRA’s buying and selling practices and regulations over cross-border trade”.

The fear of maize shortages is, in the opinion of most stakeholders, the driving factor behind costly and ineffective maize input and marketing policies. The most salient factor in food security policy in Zambia is the chronically low yields for smallholder maize. Locally available hybrid maize varieties have the potential for yields 4 times greater than the current average for small farmers in Zambia. If maize yields could be increased 40-50% to an average of 2.5 MT/hectare, the resulting surplus production would dramatically reduce GRZ fear of shortages in most years. However, in the absence of increased maize productivity and production, the government appears to rely on policies such as export bans and the FRA to ensure domestic food (maize) security, both which have a negative impact on private sector involvement.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

A. CLEARLY DEFINED AND CONSISTENT POLICY FRAMEWORK

Status: Green

The National Agriculture Policy (NAP 2004 – 2015) document has clear objectives and strategies and the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP 2014-2019) provides additional detail. Both are aligned with the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP). The biggest concern for many stakeholders is the unpredictability and inconsistency of policy implementation between stated intentions and priorities laid out in the plans and actions, especially in the maize sub-sector.

B. PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

Status: Yellow

Policy development processes are generally transparent and in line with the existing legal framework. USAID supported parliamentary reforms have helped increase participation of the legislature. However, while there is a clearly articulated legal process for developing and approving policy, this process is not always adhered to, and is often by-passed during the law-making and implementation processes. The speed of the policy approval process is considerably influenced by a small group of high-level policy makers. Recent increased use of statutory instruments with little predictability and transparency has compromised this area.

C. CLEAR AND FUNCTIONAL LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM

Status: Yellow

Legislative requirements are defined but further parliamentary reform is still needed to get the legislature to a level where it can have real influence on food security policy. The balance of power tilts very heavily in favor of the executive. In practice, the executive, driven by the President, exerts a lot of influence over the legislative branch and the extent of parliamentary oversight is limited.
D. APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS/JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK

*Status: Yellow*

The Judiciary is perceived to be fair but legal processes can be slow and protracted, not providing quick relief to disputes relating to food security policy. Stakeholders feel they have little effective means to challenge the policy decisions of the Executive, such as the ban on the export of maize.

E. CLEARLY DEFINED INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

*Status: Red*

Key government responsibilities are defined, but the lack of consistency and predictability of application of policies remains a major source of concern and one that seems to have grown in usage in the last two years. The use of Statutory Instruments (a way of delegating legislative and policy-making power to the executive) places significant power in the Minister of Agriculture, without scope for review/questions by other arms of government such as the legislature, or by non-state actors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop and support programs with the Parliament and make existing laws (including proclamations, regulations, directives) more readily available to the public on-line and in print, starting with agriculture and food security-related laws. An inclusive comment period of 30 days should be implemented across the board.

2. Provide technical support to Parliament to develop and operate a web-based legislation tracking system that tracks the passage of legislation through its steps to Parliament, and make this available to the public online.

3. Most of the difficult food security policy and political issues concern maize. Non-maize policies affecting crops such as wheat, rice, soybeans and non-food commodities are generally supportive of the private sector and involve little or no subsidies or restrictions on trade of inputs or outputs. USAID and other donors should make a clear distinction between maize and non-maize agricultural policies when engaging the government and other stakeholders.

4. Use government and donor cooperation frameworks for stakeholder and donor engagement (SAGs, etc.) to advocate for much less use of statutory instruments, greater review and consultation, and longer comment periods.
POLICY ELEMENT 2: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION

The formulation of national and macro-level policies and strategies is predominantly undertaken by the central government. Policy making in Zambia is highly centralized, with the process driven to a large degree by the President’s Office.

OVERVIEW

Zambia has a centralized administrative system that oversees government functions across 10 provinces. Provincial and district heads of government administration fall under the Office of the President which sets the country’s policy agenda. Moves towards decentralization have stalled for several years despite there being a decentralization policy dating back to 2003.

The President works with Cabinet Offices (consisting of Ministers appointed by the President) especially in policy implementation. Some of the major policies, including in agriculture, have come into effect through Presidential pronouncements that are not always preceded by or based on formalized policy development processes.

The Zambian legislative process usually starts with a bill being introduced by a Line Minister or ordinary Member of Parliament. Bills emanating from the Executive branch require cabinet approval. A bill will go through a first reading before being passed on to a parliamentary portfolio committee, such as the agriculture committee. The committee will discuss the bill and invite presentations from government and also from other institutions and individuals. The entire House of Parliament is then given a chance to debate the bill between the second and third reading. The bill is then read in its final form (third reading) before a vote is taken and, if passed by simple majority, it goes for Presidential assent.

Most pieces of legislation provide for significant delegated authority to the Line Minister in terms of when and how such legislation is enacted. In particular, Line Ministers often use Statutory Instruments (a form of delegated legislative power) to implement specific policy measures as determined by the executive.

The full house of Parliament has the authority to question Line Ministers on various matters. Parliamentary portfolio committees have the power to summon civil servants to appear before them in connection with any matter that the Speaker of Parliament may refer to them. However, there appears to be no clear mechanisms for ensuring that the executive maintains accountability to parliament. The executive arm of government has significant leeway in policy development and implementation, with the legislature having a more limited role.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL), headed by a Line Minister, is the primary institution for food security policy development, with full responsibility for development and coordination of agricultural development programs and projects. It works closely with other government agencies that work within the food security space. The most prominent agency is
the **Food Reserve Agency (FRA)** whose primary mandate (according to the law that established it) is to maintain national strategic food reserves.

MAL currently has three major departments – Agriculture (crops), Livestock and Administration - with each one headed by a Deputy Minister. There are 10 Directorates, and one of these, Policy and Planning, plays a key role in policy development and coordination.

## CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

### A. APPROVED FOOD SECURITY STRATEGY/INVESTMENT PLAN

**Status: Green**

Under the NAIP that came into effect in 2014, the country has a comprehensive multi-year food security plan. It has a strong evidence base and provides clarity on country priorities. It does not have a great level of operational detail.

### B. PREDICTABLE POLICY AGENDA AND PRIORITIES DEVELOPMENT

**Status: Yellow**

Policies in the NAP and NAIP are clearly articulated, consistent and prioritized. There have been efforts to ensure that these two are harmonized, together with the SNDP and the Ministry of Agriculture’s strategic plan. However, there has been unpredictability around policy implementation that is inconsistent with the priorities and policy reform needed as stated in the document. This is evidenced by unexpected export bans, a large budget allocation to storage for FRA in the 2014 planned budget, two years of delays in implementing an E-Voucher system, and the launch of a government-managed fertilizer manufacturing facility that has had no stakeholder dialogue and is inconsistent with an e-voucher program and greater inclusion of private sector in input supply. These well-known cases continue to undermine private sector, donor and stakeholder confidence in the country’s food security policy agenda.

### C. ANNUAL WORK PLANS

**Status: Red**

No such work plan seems to exist outside (or in addition to) the annual National Budget cycle which does not break down the agriculture budget into budget lines that correspond to plans such as the NAIP. This introduces inconsistency between planning and implementation, e.g. lack of funding for the E-Voucher system.

### D. FUNCTIONING COORDINATION PROCESS

**Status: Red**

No functional coordinating unit could be identified during the assessment. The agriculture sector working group meets monthly and is organized. It is usually attended by members of MAL’s policy and planning unit as well as IAPRI. The cooperating partners regularly update activities in a donor tracking matrix, this is mapped to the NAIP priority areas and shared with other partners and MAL. MAL does call special meetings with the Agriculture Cooperating
Partner group to discuss policy issues, and these are larger stakeholder meetings (AgSAG). While special meetings are more frequent, they are not predictable, and they are called with little notice, preventing sufficient time for review and substantive comment by multiple stakeholders. The Agriculture Sector Advisory Group (AgSAG) has not been utilized in a systematic, regular, planned part of policy discussion, development and coordination as it is envisioned. There is dialogue between Government and Zambia National Farmers Union, an important non-state actors, as well as with millers and traders, but this is often held in isolation, and is not part of an organized AgSAG.

E. SECRETARIAT/ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTION

Status: Yellow

The Policy and Planning directorate in MAL appears to have staff capable of performing required processes. However, the effectiveness of the administrative support functions within the MAL remains constrained by limited funding for equipment, training and communications.

F. TECHNICAL CAPACITY

Status: Green

The MAL Policy and Planning directorate has the mandate to perform the following functions: identify policy and technical challenges/issues, develop sector or project-specific policies/strategies, consult with the private sector and draft funding proposals. While there has been movement of senior staff to the private and NGO sectors in recent years, there is a core of long-term, senior staff with a deep knowledge of the Zambian agricultural sector.

G. POLITICAL SUPPORT AND APPROVAL

Status: Yellow

Agriculture and food security has very strong political attention and commitment in Zambia, as evidenced by the participation of high-level decision-makers in food security policy. However, the political aspect of agricultural policy also makes the process highly unpredictable for many stakeholders, resulting in a Yellow designation.

H. ENGAGEMENT OF PARLIAMENT/LEGISLATIVE BODY

Status: Yellow

The parliamentary Committee on Agriculture covers legislative issues on the sector. The committee may request reports from MAL officials on matters that have been referred to it by the Speaker of Parliament, including matters associated with planning or implementation. However, the capacity of the committee to undertake independent analysis and enforce its comments is limited due to inadequate internal capacity and weak systems for ensuring accountability of the executive arm of government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strengthening MAL capacity (particularly the Policy and Planning Directorate) to develop systems and mechanisms to enhance its planning function, especially in view of current
efforts to enhance M&E that can strengthen stakeholder alignment, reporting results and the rollout of M&E at district, province and national levels.

2. Continue parliamentary reforms to enhance the role of parliament in policy development and monitoring, in particular strengthening communication and feedback mechanisms between the sub-committee on agriculture with stakeholders and MAL, and use of new M&E systems aligned to the NAIP.
POLICY ELEMENT 3: INCLUSIVITY AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

Inclusion of the private sector and civil society organizations in policy formulation discussions at a substantive level is uneven within the Zambian agriculture sector. While there are numerous fora for stakeholder consultation, the private sector often is surprised by policy announcements such as the grain export ban and the new minimum wage requirements. Especially in the context of maize policy, consultation is often viewed by stakeholder groups as a frustrating exercise.

OVERVIEW

The government has been working with cooperating partners, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector to establish various avenues through which consultation and dialogue can take place. There are, for instance, Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) covering all the key stakeholders which meet with government to provide input to policy development and implementation. The respective Line Ministry chairs each SAG and operates the secretariat. The Agriculture SAG convenes infrequently, often with little advance notice from the Government. Another multi-stakeholder platform for consultation and dialogue around agriculture policy development is the Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF). The board is elected by the members and it has a full-time secretariat that is independent of government. The Agri-Business Forum (ABF) is a private sector initiative that also seeks to develop and maintain ongoing engagement with government. The ABF is also a member of ACF. Various agriculture sub-sector and commodity associations have been established in the recent years, while the Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) has existed (under different names) since 1905 and is a major voice in issues of agriculture policy development. IAPRI another influential stakeholder in agricultural policy development.

Most stakeholders, including the government, see the following recent actions as positive developments for agriculture and food security: Elimination of the miller subsidy, passage and implementation of the new Seed Law, removal of the fuel subsidy and the reduction in the quantity of maize procured by the Food Reserve Agency, announced plan to implement e-vouchers under FISP, overall reduction of budget allocations to FISP and FRA and increase in R&D, extension and social nets in 2014 Budget allocations. However, high turnover among senior government officials at the Minister, Deputy Minister and Permanent Secretary level heightens uncertainty regarding overall policy direction and commitment.
CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

A. INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE POLICY COORDINATION MANAGEMENT ENTITY

*Status: Yellow*

No functional formal policy coordination entity or mechanism exists to play this role. The AgSAG and institutions such as ACF appear to have been established for this purpose, but their direct involvement in policy formulation is limited.

B. OUTREACH AND COMMUNICATIONS

*Status: Yellow (tending toward Red)*

Stakeholders report that information on policy reform is generally not widely available and only circulated after the policy has been drafted. Communication meetings are intermittent and not grounded on formally established mechanisms, with information flows reported to be largely one way and with very short turn-around for consultation.

C. PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION – OPPORTUNITY/SPACE

*Status: Yellow*

There are multiple private sector associations and organizations, such as the ACF and ZNFU traders, millers, seed companies, agro-dealers, IAPRI and commodity-based associations which engage in dialogue with the government on food security issues. However, many private sector representatives question whether these are meaningful opportunities given surprise announcements on export bans or long delays in implementing policies such as those to do with agriculture input and marketing systems.

D. PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION – CAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE

*Status: Yellow*

Private sector organizations generally are able to represent their members and articulate policy positions that draw on evidence-based analysis. The private sector is provided with the opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussion, though such participation is often trumped by political considerations in policy decision making.

E. PARTICIPATION OF CSOS – OPPORTUNITY/SPACE

*Status: Yellow*

Platforms exist for effective CSO participation in policy formulation and strategy discussion, with some CSOs able to engage government directly. The CAADP process was quite effective in this regard. The main farmer organization, the Zambia National Farmers Union, represents a wide spectrum of farmers. Faith-based and conservation-oriented organizations are actively engaged in policy dialogue with varying degrees of effectiveness.
F. PARTICIPATION OF CSOS – CAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE

Status: Yellow

The major CSO groups appear to have capacity to effectively engage in government-led policy processes. Smaller organizations such as We Effect and COMACO have less internal capacity to develop and assess policy strategies and implementation approaches, and so tend to draw on the work of actors such as IAPRI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Support multi-sectoral coordination mechanisms/frameworks that strengthen effectiveness of stakeholder input to agriculture policy. This could be through support to institutions such as ACF and/or structures such as the Agriculture SAG.

2. Support networking and public-private dialogue forums and joint leadership training events that can continue to build trust between public, private, and civil society.
POLICY ELEMENT 4: EVIDENCE-BASED ANALYSIS

There is a significant amount of solid evidence-based analysis of agricultural policy issues and options in Zambia. This includes technocrats in the Central Statistics office and MAL as well as in IAPRI and various private sector associations and companies. Opinions differ between government officials and non-state actors about the degree to which policy decisions are evidence-based.

OVERVIEW

Zambia has several primary government organizations engaged in data collection, compilation, analysis and reporting at different levels. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) is a lead institution with the overall mandate of generating different economic and social statistics at the national and provincial level. The Policy and Planning Directorate of the MAL conducted a significant amount of the analysis for the NAIP and the annual budget process. IAPRI and ACF carry out research and analysis on a wide range of agricultural topics which they disseminate via workshops, seminars and reports. To varying degrees, major trade associations, such as the Grain Traders Association and the Zambia National Farmer Union conduct their own analyses of public data and membership information for policy dialogue purposes. IFPRI, Zambian universities and the state-supported Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) also conduct and publish policy analysis that informs agricultural policy debates.

Many stakeholders outside of government cite frustration not with the lack of evidence-based research, but rather the incidence of policy decisions that ignore or downplay evidence that does not support politically desirable options.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

A. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS COMPLETED AS A COMPONENT OF PLANNING:

Status: Green

Over the past several years the CAADP process and the completion of the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) and the National Agricultural Implementation Plan (NAIP) has strengthened the overall economic and financial analysis capability of the government for sector planning. Challenges remain at the Line Ministry level where short-term planning, monitoring and evaluation systems need to be improved. Budgets, however, are not aligned with this analysis found in the NAIP.
B. PERFORMANCE MONITORING MEASURES AND TARGETS DEVELOPED.

*Status: Green*

The NAIP has very clear performance monitoring measures that provide a solid basis for M&E. Implementation will now be the challenge.

C. QUALITY DATA EXISTS FOR POLICY MONITORING

*Status: Green*

Good agricultural data exists, compared to many countries. The CSO implements a robust and reliable crop forecast survey (CFS) each year that is utilized frequently by MAL and other actors. IAPRI, with CSO, implements a nationally representative Rural Agricultural Livelihoods survey (RALS) which includes poverty data, income data, and agricultural production information. MAL implements a Post-Harvest Survey annually, but this survey has not been robust nor data cleaned and shared. Overall, much of the data for the M&E system is available, or can be collected with existing systems, if the process is aligned and implemented according to the new M&E process. An M&E manual developed throughout 2013 is fully aligned with the NAIP and SNDP, has indicators, collection systems, and processes laid out. However, the M&E system has not yet been rolled out, and still needs to be implemented and tied to annual budget and multiple actors aligned to the NAIP.

D. QUALITY DATA IS AVAILABLE FOR POLICY MAKING

*Status: Yellow*

Data is available, but is often not timely or easily accessed by all that need to participate in policy formulation. IAPRI, for example, is planning a new communications outreach program to enhance the accessibility and clarity of its data and analysis.

E. INCLUSION OF ANALYSIS IN THE POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

*Status: Yellow*

Independent evidence has not regularly informed maize policy discussions in the formulation stage or during impact evaluation. The track record for other food and non-food crops is better. Stakeholders report a growing openness by policy makers for evidence-based decision making, which is most clearly demonstrated through the NAIP.

F. CAPACITY TO MONITOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

*Status: Yellow*

Currently the government’s food security policy Monitoring and Evaluation system is weak, but there are serious efforts underway by both government and cooperating partners to strengthen the system. Parliament does not currently have an independent process to conduct policy-related M&E.
G. ANNUAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT REPORT PRODUCED AND REVIEWED

*Status: Yellow*

While it is intended that NAIP implementation will be subjected to annual performance reviews, the only current mechanism to operationalize this is the establishment of a SAKSS node, which is underway.

H. INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS CAPACITY EXISTS

*Status: Green*

IAPRI has emerged as the one Zambian institution with internal capacity for sophisticated food policy analysis. Other local institutions draw on external consultants for much of their analytical work.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Formalize agriculture performance review, reporting and dissemination processes in the context of NAIP implementation through the establishment of a SAKSS node, as well as an institutional framework that allows for mutual accountability of all partners, and regular, systematic reviews

2. Provide additional support to IAPRI to improve outreach and communication of research findings using social media and other mechanisms to reach rural stakeholders.

3. Support measures to improve public availability of key agriculture statistics, including a high-level dialogue focusing on the quality and consistency of publically generated data.

4. Support efforts to strengthen data and information flow between the national and local governments. Provide additional support to MAL to strengthen and harmonize the new M&E systems manual and support dissemination, training, strengthened systems, and use at district and provincial levels.
POLICY ELEMENT 5: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The policy implementation process is characterized by a high degree of unpredictability and limited transparency, and suffers from capacity constraints and high turnover of key decision-makers on the part of government.

OVERVIEW

Policy implementation is the responsibility of individual ministerial technical units. The work of these units is aligned with the NAIP and coordinated within the MAL, across ministries, and with donor programs through the Agriculture Chapter of the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) and the Patriotic Front Manifesto.

MAL is responsible for technical and budgetary coordination of the NAIP. The MAL uses the Agricultural Sector Advisory Group (AgSAG) to engage stakeholders on key issues affecting the sector, as well as report on implementation. At the sub-national level, existing structures such as the Agriculture and Environment Subcommittees of the Provincial and also the District Development and Coordination Committees (PDCC and DDCC) oversee implementation of specific projects within their jurisdictions.

Monitoring of the NAIP’s progress is the responsibility of the MAL. A comprehensive food security policy M&E system is under development, with support from the EU, Finland, Sweden and USAID that will harmonize data gathering and reporting systems under old Ministries, as well as delineate responsibilities at district and Provincial levels. There are current efforts towards development a Monitoring and Evaluation section within MAL’s Policy and Planning Directorate. As part of this effort, a SAKSS node is being designed, as collaboration between MAL, IAPRI, Resakss Southern Africa, funded by USAID. Outside of MAL, evidence-based policy making and policy monitoring has some strong technical structures including the Central Statistics Office and the independent NGO, IAPRI, which are envisioned to support effective monitoring and evaluation of the NAIP.

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

A. IMPLEMENTATION PLANS DEVELOPED

Status: Green

The NAIP is Zambia’s guiding policy framework for agriculture and food security. It is widely viewed to be a very well developed policy and investment framework. The NAIP has sufficient specificity and targets to serve as a guideline for the programs of government and financial and technical partners.
B. SYSTEM IN PLACE TO ANALYZE IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

*Status: Yellow*

The MAL plans to conduct annual NAIP reviews, but it is unclear to what extent capacity constraint issues will be addressed. The NAIP does not go into analysis of implementation capacity constraints.

C. FOOD SECURITY POLICY PRIORITIES ALIGNED WITH WORK PLANS OF LINE MINISTRIES

*Status: Yellow*

The 2014 Budget allocated approximately 50-60 percent of MAL funding to FISP and FRA support, which is not in line with the stated objectives of the NAIP. However, there was a significant decrease from the 2013 Budget (which FISP and FRA made up closer to 70 percent), and there was an increase in research and development, feeder roads, and food security packs which target the very vulnerable, all in line with the NAIP. This is a positive direction, but still requires a significant decrease in FISP and FRA funding to fully fund the NAIP. Overall the amount dedicated to MAL was less than the commitment stated in the NAIP for 2014. NAIP implementation will require institutional re-alignment between line ministries, especially to adequately deal with cross-cutting areas such as natural resources, water management and nutrition that involve multiple ministries and agencies.

D. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION BUDGET COMMITTED BY HOST COUNTRY

*Status: Yellow*

The total share of the National budget devoted to the agricultural sector exceeded 10% between 2007 and 2012. However, Zambia achieved this spending goal primarily through supplemental funding to finance the purchase of surplus maize by the Food Reserve Agency during bumper years. Absent this supplemental funding, spending on agriculture drops below 7% from 2010-2012.

E. SUPPLEMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION FUNDS SECURED

*Status: Green*

Zambia has so far enjoyed significant goodwill with development partners and has therefore accessed funding from the World Bank group, the EU, AfDF, DFID, Finland, Sweden, USAID, JICA, FAO, and WFP for various agriculture initiatives ranging from research to food production/productivity improvements. After approval of the NAIP during the Business Meeting, Zambia applied for, and received $31.2 million USD in supplemental GAFSP funding to support NAIP implementation.
F. ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF STAFF TO IMPLEMENT POLICY CHANGE

Status: Yellow

The administrative and technical capacity of MAL staff to undertake required support (coordination, communication, documentation, budgetary planning, etc.) is moderate. This problem is aggravated by high staff turnover at senior levels.

G. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Status: Yellow

The NAIP has an ambitious plan for monitoring and evaluation, but required monitoring and evaluation resources are yet to be allocated. Further, current support from ReSAKSS is largely of a technical nature and may not deal with the important aspect of institutionalizing monitoring and evaluation within the overall agriculture and food security framework.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While there are many mechanisms for consultation, the track record on policy implementation, for instance the Agricultural Marketing Act and the E-Voucher system, is very poor. IAPRI presents USAID with a unique opportunity to support evidence-based research on key topics such as the costs and impact of FISP and FRA coupled with *wider dissemination of findings to civil society, the public and Parliament*. A bottom up approach to build support for policy change based on clear and understandable reports, visual aids and media outreach could go a long way to speed up enactment of long delayed policies such as the Agricultural Marketing Act.

2. Financial and technical support towards the development and institutionalization of monitoring and evaluation will enhance transparency and predictability of agriculture policy implementation, and its alignment to the NAP, NAIP and other relevant policies and strategies.
POLICY ELEMENT 6: MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The Mutual Accountability framework in Zambia has well defined mechanisms and structures in place. However, there are challenges with regard to the proper functioning of the mechanisms and structure. The joint stakeholder government-donor coordination group at the center of technical and financial support for food security policies meets rarely. Meetings are often called on very short notice by the Government which limits detailed preparation and engagement by the donors.

OVERVIEW

Under the CAADP framework, the Government works with the Agriculture Sector Advisory Group (AgSAG) to coordinate activities with all key stakeholders and implement the Performance Enhancement Program. The Policy and Planning Directorate of the MAL serves as the Secretariat for the AgSAG.

The Agriculture Cooperating Partners Group is a government-donor coordination group focused on agriculture, food security and natural resources management, and established to promote mutual accountability. The Cooperating Partners Group is currently chaired by the European Union with FAO and Finland sharing chair responsibilities on a rotating basis. There is an incoming and outgoing (most recently USAID) chair each year among the bilateral and multilateral donors that make up the group. The CAADP agenda and the Vision 2030 program provide the structure for mobilizing financial and technical support from donors. Within these structures, the Cooperating Partners have organized their support to the agriculture sector in conjunction with the National Aid Policy and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ).

CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

A. A FORUM EXISTS FOR REGULARLY SCHEDULED DONOR-GOVERNMENT MEETINGS

Status: Yellow
The Agricultural Cooperating Partners group meets monthly, and there is frequently representation from MAL in these meetings. There are also informal working groups, such as for e-vouchers, and NAIP implementation. Communication at a technical working group level is strong. However, the Agriculture Sector Advisory Group meets infrequently, with little or no notice of meetings being provided in advance.

B. JOINT POLICY PRIORITIES DEVELOPED

Status: Yellow
Joint policy priorities are clearly articulated in the CAADP agreement and NAIP, however implementation of policy priorities in the maize sector often contradict the agreed upon priorities.
There is a mismatch between stated intentions and actions taken (for example, export bans and indefinite delays in implementation of the e-voucher program).

C. MONITORING SYSTEM EXISTS

*Status: Yellow*

The NAIP provides the necessary framework upon which to structure a monitoring system with clear strategic objectives. With the support of ReSAKSS, an M&E system is currently being developed and at least one staff member has been appointed. However, this process is still at an early stage and will need significant support to ensure a functional and sustainable monitoring system.

D. DONOR COORDINATION – ALIGNMENT AND HARMONIZATION

*Status: Green*

Donor coordination and alignment with government agriculture and food security policies as articulated in the NAIP and NAP is strong. All the large bilateral and multilateral donors have agreed to align with the NAIP and have harmonized their programs to those of the government. However, joint work planning is not currently done for projects that are “off-budget”. Despite the harmonized approach, there is a general sense of frustration over high turnover rates among senior government officials and delays in addressing FISP and FRA policy imperatives.

E. PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY

*Status: Yellow*

While there are instances in which private sector associations invite MAL or other government officials to speak to them in their annual or other periodic meetings and a few private sector representatives are invited to adhoc meetings with the government. The general impression from the private sector is that the government does not see itself needing to explain its actions to the private sector. There is some consultation but it is felt that this has relatively little substance.

F. CSO SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY

*Status: Yellow*

Civil society organizations and non-governmental groups involved in the agriculture sector cite the highly inclusive CAADP process as a model for coordination with the government. Likewise, the recent NAIP process was seen as participatory. However, such consultation is often seen by CSOs as lacking substantive impact on resultant policy decisions such items as conservation agriculture and cooperative development that many of the CSOs support. Further, there is a core set of CSOs that are often called upon (for example, ZNFU) who may not represent the diversity of CSOs in the sector.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The structure of the current system for mutual accountability needs to be reviewed to allow for more regular interaction between the government, donors and non-state actors. Moving the secretariat for the Ag SAG to an organization outside the MAL should be considered as a means of implementing a schedule of regular Ag SAG meetings.

2. There is growing recognition that for both fiscal and technical reasons the two most visible programs, FISP and FRA, are not achieving the policy objectives of reducing rural poverty and building small scale agriculture. However, any reduction in these programs is perceived to be politically risky because it appears as an abandonment of small farmers. While USAID has limited capacity to influence these policies, it could have significant ability to promote increased maize productivity and production through support for research, extension and improved production and storage practices, outreach and communication regarding the real vs. perceived benefits of the programs for the rural poor. The most effective way to change ineffective GRZ maize policies would be to eliminate the driving force behind these policies – fear of the consequences of maize shortages.

Conclusions:

“We could be doing even better”. This quote sums up the feelings of many stakeholders who were interviewed during the Food Security Policy assessment. It reflects the serious concerns that some aspects of the policy formulation and implementation environment need to be revised or changed. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that Zambia has made significant progress in improving the policy environment in recent years, and that in comparison with some other countries covered by the Africa LEAD assessment, Zambia is performing well. The following points represent broad areas of consensus across the government, private sector, NGO and donor representatives who participated in the assessment:

1. The National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) has a strong private sector focus. However, the 2014 Budget and current policies are not well aligned with the NAIP focus.

2. The Government has an enduring lack of trust in the private sector’s ability/capacity and incentives to prevent food shortages.

3. The unpredictability of policy formulation and implementation (e.g. the recent ban on maize exports, new government manufacturing of fertilizer and postponement of the E-Voucher system) creates a lack of trust in the government on the part of the private sector. High turnover among senior government officials at the Minister, Deputy Minister and Permanent Secretary positions heightens uncertainty regarding overall policy direction and commitment.

4. High and enduring rates of rural poverty in the face of consistent growth in the agricultural sector in the past several years indicates that intended benefits of the FISP and FRA are not reaching the most vulnerable. Maize yields for small farmers have been stagnant in the range of 1.7 to 1.9 metric tons per hectare for the past decade or more despite fertilizer subsidies and “guaranteed” government purchasing programs.

5. The principal issues affecting food security policy formulation and implementation in Zambia are primarily political rather than policy based. There is significant technical expertise and analytical capacity inside and outside government (including the private sector) to
provide evidence based policy recommendations and strategies. However, the over-riding fear of food shortages and the political impact that such shortages would trigger consistently undermines efforts to reform the FISP and the FRA programs. The open-ended maize export ban that took effect in September can be viewed, in this context, as a rational action to reduce the likelihood of maize shortages, even if the long-term impact may be to drive commercial and medium sized farmers away from growing maize in the future.

6. **The government wants and needs to be seen as visibly helping small farmers.** There is growing recognition that for both fiscal and technical reasons the two most visible programs, FISP and FRA, are not achieving the policy objectives of reducing rural poverty and building small scale agriculture. However, any reduction in these programs is politically risky because it appears as an abandonment of small farmers. The challenge for USAID and other donors is to find alternative ways for the GRZ to demonstrate its commitment to small farmers and rural communities.

7. **Most of the difficult agricultural policy and political issues concern maize.** Non-maize policies affecting crops such as wheat, rice, soybeans and non-food commodities are generally supportive of the private sector and involve little or no subsidies or restrictions on trade of inputs or outputs. USAID should make the distinction between maize and non-maize agricultural policies when it is engaging the government and other stakeholders.

8. The fear of maize shortages is, in the opinion of most stakeholders, the driving factor behind costly and ineffective maize input and marketing policies. **The most salient factor in food security policy in Zambia is the chronically low yields for smallholder maize.** Locally available hybrid maize varieties have the potential for yields 5 times greater than the current average for small farmers in Zambia. If maize yields could be increased 40-50% to an average of 2.5 MT/hectare, the resulting surplus production would dramatically reduce GRZ fear of shortages in most years. However, in absence of increased maize productivity and production, the government will continue to rely on policies such as export bans and the FRA to ensure domestic food (maize) security. In fact, the FISP may actually be keeping yields low due to the lack of choice in the type of fertilizer and seed available under the program. While USAID has limited capacity to influence such policies, it could have significant ability to promote increased maize productivity and production through support for research, extension and improved production and storage practices. The most effective way to change ineffective or harmful GRZ maize policies is to eliminate the driving force behind these policies – political fear of maize shortages.

9. Helping to create and sustain trust between the public and private sector is another area where USAID can support improved policy formulation and implementation. While there are many mechanisms for consultation, including the ACF, the track record on policy implementation, for instance the Agricultural Marketing Act and the E-Voucher system, is very poor. **IAPRI presents USAID with a unique opportunity to support evidence-based research on key topics such as the costs and impact of FISP and FRA coupled with wider dissemination of findings to civil society and Parliament.** A bottom up approach to build support for policy change based on clear and understandable reports, visual aids and media outreach could go a long way to speed up enactment of long delayed policies such as the Agricultural Marketing Act.
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<th>Name &amp; Position</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
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</table>
## CAPACITY OF POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Element 1: Predictability of the Guiding Policy Framework</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework: The policy framework impacting food security policy-making is clearly defined, and consistently applied and enforced from year to year.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability and Transparency of the Policy Making process: The policy development process is transparent in accordance with the rules contained within the country's constitution, basic law, and elsewhere in the formal legal framework.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear and Functional Legislative System: There is a legislative capacity to deal with food security policy change, and the legislative requirements are clearly defined and predictable.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate Dispute Resolution Process/Judicial Framework: The judicial system is perceived as fair and effective, and there is an appropriate system for dispute resolution where conflicts arise relating to food security policy.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly defined Institutional Responsibilities: Institutional responsibilities are clearly defined, consistently applied, and predictable from year to year.</td>
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</table>
## Capacity of Policy Change Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Element 2: Policy Development &amp; Coordination</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approved Food Security Strategy/Investment Plan:</strong> There is an approved/official multi-sectoral, multi-year food security plan developed, which specifies priorities and objectives, and addresses the roles of various contributors, including across government, the private sector, and CSOs. The vision and strategy to improve food security is clear.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The vision and strategy appear clear. A National Agriculture Policy (NAP 2004–2015) document has objectives and strategies, as well as highlighting sector priorities. The National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP 2014) provides more additional detail and more clearly outlines the role of private sector.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predictable Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed:</strong> The policy items required to achieve the national food strategy have been identified and documented, i.e., specific policy objectives exist.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies in the NAP and NAIP are clearly articulated, consistent and prioritized. However, there has also been recent policy implementation unpredictability relating to export bans, the FRA and the E-Voucher system, which serve to undermine this policy agenda.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Work Plans:</strong> There is an annual work plan that identifies objectives and activities in regard to policy development.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
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<tr>
<td>No such work plan seems to exist outside (or in addition to) the annual budgeting cycle. The annual budget is inconsistent with the NAIP, e.g., lack of funding for the E-Voucher system.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination Process:</strong> There is an entity, such as a coordination unit or task force, that has defined membership and meets regularly to discuss, develop and coordinate food security policy development (and oversee cross-sector coordination).</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No functional coordinating unit could be identified during the assessment. ACF has the mandate to help coordinate between the public and private sectors, but has difficulty convening stakeholders. Intra-governmental coordination appears weak to non-existent. The Agricultural Sector Advisory Group (AgSAG) has not been a regular part of policy discussion, development and coordination.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secretariat/Administrative Support Function:</strong> There is an adequate staff capability to perform required support processes, including coordination, meeting management, communication, and document management. This may be a stand-alone secretariat, or a responsibility within an existing entity.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Policy and Planning Directorate appears to have staff capable of performing required processes. However, the effectiveness of the administrative support functions within the MAL remains constrained by limited funding for equipment, training and communications.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Capacity:</strong> There are work groups, or technical committees, that have the authority and capacity to perform the following functions: identify policy and technical challenges/issues, develop sector- or project-specific policies/strategies, consult within the sector and draft funding proposals. There should be active participation by the private sector and CSOs on the technical work groups (as appropriate).</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MAL Policy and Planning unit consists of work groups and technical committees that have the authority and capacity to perform the following functions: identify policy and technical challenges/issues, develop sector- or project-specific policies/strategies, consult with the private sector and draft funding proposals. While there has been movement of senior staff to the private and NGO sectors in recent years, there is a core of long-term, senior staff with a deep knowledge of the Zambian agricultural sector.</td>
<td>![Green]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Capacity of Policy Change Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Support and Approval:</th>
<th>Agriculture and food security has very strong political attention and commitment in Zambia, as evidenced by the participation of high-level decision-makers in food security policy. However, the political aspect of agricultural policy makes the process highly unpredictable for many stakeholders.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engagement of Parliament/Legislative Body:</strong></td>
<td>The Standing Committee for Agriculture and Food Security Affairs in the parliament covers legislative issues on the sector. The Ministry of Agriculture submits bi-annual progress reports, planned activities, conducts joint meetings, and receives comments from the standing committee on issues to be approved. Standing committee oversight also extends into implementation of projects, with committee members traveling to project sites. However, the capacity of the committee to undertake independent analysis and enforce its comments is limited due to inadequate internal capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusive Participation within the Policy Coordination Management Entity:</strong> The main coordination entity has: a) clear goals and participation from key government ministries (beyond just Ministry of Agriculture) and; b) some representation from non-government entities, particularly from donors.</td>
<td>No functional formal policy coordination entity or mechanism exists to play this role. The AgSAG and institutions such as ACF appear to have been established for this purpose, but their direct involvement in policy formulation is limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outreach and Communications:</strong> There is a process for interacting with stakeholders and sharing information. This could include regular public “forums”, a website of key information and other mechanisms.</td>
<td>Stakeholders report that information on policy reform is generally only circulated after the policy has been drafted. These meetings are generally informally organized, and information flow is reported to be one way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Sector Participation – Opportunity/Space:</strong> The private sector is provided meaningful opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussions. This could be through participation in the management/steering committee, in technical work groups and/or through other forums. Communications and interactions should be two-way, and access to key information should be readily available.</td>
<td>There are multiple private sector associations and organizations, such as the ACF and ZNFU which provide venues for dialogue with the government on food security issues. However, many private sector representatives question whether these are meaningful opportunities given surprise announcements on export bans or long delays in implementing the Agricultural Marketing Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Sector Participation – Capacity to Participate:</strong> Some organizations representing the private sector have the capacity to participate in government-led discussions on food policy. This is to say they are able to represent their members, they are able to articulate and communicate policy positions, and they are able to provide some level of evidence-based analysis to support their viewpoints.</td>
<td>Private sector organizations generally able to represent their members and articulate policy positions that draw on evidence-based analysis. Private sector is provided with the opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussion, though such participation is often trumped by political considerations in policy decision making.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Capacity of Policy Change Indicators

### Participation of CSOs – Opportunity/Space: The CSO sector, including representation from women’s associations and farmers associations, is provided meaningful opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussions. This could be through participation in the management/steering committee, in technical work groups and/or through other forums. Communications and interactions should be two-way, and access to key information should be readily available.

- Platforms exist for effective CSO participation in policy formulation and strategy discussion, with some CSOs able to engage government directly. The CAADP process was quite effective in this regard. The main farmer organization (ZNFU) represents a wide spectrum of farmers. Faith-based and conservation-oriented organizations are actively engaged in policy dialogue with varying degrees of effectiveness.

### Participation of CSOs – Capacity to Participate: Some organizations representing civil society, including representation from women’s associations and farmers associations, have the capacity to participate in government-led discussions on food policy. This is to say they are able to represent their members, they are able to articulate and communicate policy positions, and they are able to provide some level of evidence-based analysis to support their viewpoints.

- The major CSO groups appear to have capacity to effectively engage in government-led policy processes. Smaller organizations, such as We Effect and COMACO, have less internal capacity to develop and assess policy strategies and implementation approaches.

### Policy Element 4: Evidence-based Analysis

#### Economic and Financial Analysis Completed as a Component of Planning: National food security priority policy initiatives/investment plans are based on economic and financial analysis, including independent policy analysis. The analysis is available for public review.

- Over the past several years the CAADP process and the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) and the National Agricultural Implementation Plan (NAIP) have strengthened the Economic and Financial analysis capability of the government for sector planning. Though some policy development processes are consultative and allow non-state actors to present economic and financial analysis, it is unclear whether such analysis forms part of resultant policy.

#### Performance Monitoring Measures and Targets Developed: The national food security policies/plans include specific objectives, performance indicators, and targets exist to monitor the accomplishment of the objectives.

- The NAIP has very clear performance monitoring measures that provide a solid basis for M&E.

#### Quality Data Exists for Policy Monitoring: There is a database of quality statistics that is used to routinely report and analyze progress in achieving objectives. (Analysis to be conducted by USDA – and not as part of this assessment framework.)

- The MAL has not yet established a data collection system tied to the NAIP indicators or annual budget. While there are surveys and assessments conducted by the CSO and MAL, these activities are not directly tied to monitoring the impact of specific food security policies.

#### Quality Data is Available for Policy Making: Data on the performance of the agriculture sector and the food security are publically available and shared in a timely manner. This information is available for others to use and analyze.

- National level agricultural data exists, including annual crop forecasts and a national livelihoods survey conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). IAPRI produces a series of independent reports that are available to the parliament and the general public. The issue is not so much a question of the accuracy of data, but rather its application for policy monitoring.
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<tr>
<th>Capacity of Policy Change Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusion of Analysis in the Policy Development Process:</strong> Evidence-based analysis is considered and used to develop policy priorities/policy proposals.</td>
<td>Independent evidence has not regularly informed policy discussions in the formulation stage or during impact evaluation. However, stakeholders such as IAPRI and ACF report a growing openness by policy makers to evidence-based decision making, which is most clearly demonstrated through the NAIP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity to Monitor Policy Implementation and Results:</strong> The government has the ability to review data on policy performance and produce an analysis of the policy’s effectiveness. A policy analysis function/unit exists and has adequate and skilled staff, and is sufficiently funded. If required, specific analysis can be outsourced to specialized firms or consultants as needed (case-by-case).</td>
<td>Currently the government’s food security Monitoring and Evaluation system is weak, however under the ReSAKSS mechanism efforts are underway to build this capacity. Parliament has no independent process to conduct policy M&amp;E at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Performance Measurement Report Produced and Reviewed:</strong> Evidence-based analysis is produced to review policy effectiveness (for implemented policies). A formal review session is held, and includes key development partners (including principal donors and multilateral partners, such as FAO and IFPRI). Recommendations are developed as a result of the review and incorporated into subsequent plans.</td>
<td>While it is intended that NAIP implementation will be subjected to annual performance reviews, there is currently no formal mechanism to operationalize this or to review agriculture policy effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Analysis Capacity Exists:</strong> There exists an independent capacity to analyze food security data and use the analysis to make policy recommendations and engage in policy discussion and advocacy. Such an analysis could be conducted by a research institute, university or similar non-governmental/objective organization. This capacity should be engaged in the government’s policy development and review process as, for example, through papers, forums or participation introduced in official policy review and discussion meetings.</td>
<td>IAPRI has emerged as the one Zambia institution with internal capacity for sophisticated policy analysis. It acknowledges that it needs to improve its dissemination and outreach capabilities so that there is greater access to its work. Other local institutions draw on external consultants for much of their analytical work.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation Plans Developed: The overall food security strategy has been broken down into programs and projects that have: a) a sufficient level of detail to permit implementation; b) have been “packaged” into priority projects that can be managed by ministerial units; and 3) “packaged” priorities can be translated into funding proposals to gain support for projects/programs from development partners (to address financing gaps).</td>
<td>The NAIP is Zambia’s guiding policy framework for agriculture and food security. It is widely viewed to be a very well developed policy and investment framework. The NAIP has sufficient specificity and targets to serve as a guideline for the programs of government and financial and technical partners.</td>
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### Capacity of Policy Change Indicators

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>System in Place to Analyze Implementation Capacity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constraints: An analysis of institutional, workforce, system and financial constraints is conducted. Critical implementation constraints are identified; a work plan is developed to address constraints; and implementation actions are moved forward (and periodically reviewed).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Food Security Policy Priorities Aligned with Work Plans of Line Ministries:</strong> The priority policy and associated objectives of the national food security strategy are broken down into specific programs and projects (with a sufficient level of detail) so that policy actions can be implemented by line ministries. The plans of individual ministries, and units within ministries, align with overall national strategy and its policy objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Implementation Budget Committed by Host Country:</strong> Resources are committed by the host country to implement the identified policy agenda. Over time, the country’s budget is adjusted to provide adequate financing for the implementation of actions required to implement policy priorities. Budget documents, including budget proposals, are released fully and in a timely manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supplemental Implementation Funds Secured:</strong> Proposals can be submitted, and funds secured, to address financing gaps. Funds may come from multilateral funds (such as GAFSP), regional organizations, bilateral donors and the private sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative and Technical Capacity of Staff to Implement Policy Change.</strong> The administrative and technical capacity of MAL staff to undertake required support (coordination, communication, documentation, budgetary planning, etc.) is moderate. This problem is aggravated by high staff turnover at senior levels.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and Evaluation:</strong> Capacity exists within the public sector, private sector, or civil society to review the effectiveness and impact of policy changes. Sector reviews are performed and other research evidence is collected. There is a system to share, store, and access the findings from these reviews.</td>
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<td><strong>Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A Forum Exists for Regularly Scheduled Donor-Government Meetings:</strong> These meetings discuss policy and programs and set priorities. Meetings may include, for example, Joint Sector Reviews, sector working groups or other similar arrangements.</td>
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<td>Capacity of Policy Change Indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Policy Priorities Developed:</strong> A document exists that articulates the shared policy objectives between the government and the donor community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint policy priorities are clearly articulated in the CAADP agreement and NAIP, however implementation of policy priorities in the maize sector often contradict the agreed upon priorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring System Exists:</strong> Performance measures exist (for the performance commitments of the government and for the performance commitments of the donors). There is a schedule for reviewing and documenting progress – at least on an annual basis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The NAIP provides the necessary framework upon which to structure a monitoring system with clear strategic objectives. With the support of ReSAKSS, an M&amp;E system is currently being developed and at least one staff member has been appointed. However, this process is still at an early stage and will need significant support to ensure a functional and sustainable monitoring system.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Donor Coordination – Alignment and Harmonization:</strong> There is a process for donor participation in the food security policy process and for aligning government and donor objectives and priorities. Donor programs should contribute directly to host country strategies, plans, and objectives. This may include the signing of cooperation frameworks that indicate a joint commitment to specific policy change goals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor coordination and alignment with government agriculture and food security policies as articulated in the NAIP and NAP is strong. All the big bilateral and multilateral donors have agreed to align with the NAIP and have harmonized their programs to those of the government. Despite the harmonized approach, there is a common sense of frustration over high turnover rates among senior government officials and delays in addressing FISP and FRA policy imperatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Private Sector Accountability:</strong> The government provides feedback to the private sector on the performance of the food security program (including the private sector’s role) and provides an opportunity for dialogue on the program and its performance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>While there are instances in which private sector associations invite MAL or other government officials to speak to them in their annual or other periodic meetings, the general impression provided to the team is that the government does not see itself needing to explain its actions to the private sector. There is some consultation but relatively little substance.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSO Sector Accountability:</strong> The government provides feedback to the CSO sector on the performance of the food security program (including the role of CSOs) and provides an opportunity for dialogue on the program and its performance.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society organizations and non-governmental groups involved in the agriculture sector cite the highly inclusive CAADP process as a model for coordination with the government. Likewise, the recent NAIP process was seen as highly participatory, even at the district and local levels. However, consultation often does not translate into policies supporting such areas as conservation agriculture and cooperative development that many of the CSO’s advocate.</td>
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